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INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of trade union legislation in the 1940's, union
membership in Canada has increased from about twenty percent of the
non-agricultural work force in 1942 to a high of about forty percent today.'
An even larger percentage of Canadian workers is governed by collective
agreements: perhaps as many as sixty percent work under "union" conditions.'When these figures are compared with those from the United States, where
similar unions operating under similar economic conditions have attracted
only about thirty percent of the work force into membership,", it is not immediately obvious that there is a crisis in union growth in Canada, or that
any major changes in legislative policy towards unionism are necessary.
I.

On deeper analysis, however, Canadian growth patterns give cause for
concern. Although the percentage of union membership doubled between
1942 and 1978, it was almost as high in 1958 as it is today.4 Furthermore,
although there have been significant increases in union membership over the
last ten years, a large proportion of this increase is attributable to public
sector employees who entered the union fold because of changes in legislative
policy. 5 The public sector has its own history and often its own legislative
regime," and the fact that public employees are now unionized in large numbers is no cause for optimism about the health of the system in general.
Finally, union membership is very unevenly distributed throughout the
economy: while almost three-quarters of construction workers, for example,
figure for workers in finance, insurance and real estate is
are unionized, the
only 1.4 percent.7

ILabour Organizations in Canada, 1976-1977 (Ottawa, Dept. of Lab., 1977) Table
1, and Labour Organizations in Canada, 1978 (Ottawa, Dept. of Lab., 1978) Table 1.
The actual figures are 20.6% in 1942 and 39% in 1978.
2 The Current Industrial Relations Scene in Canada, 1978, ed. Wood and Kumar,
(Kingston, Industrial Relations Centre, 1978) at 157. The figure for 1976 was 58%.
3 Id. at 260. The actual figure is 28.3% of the non-agricultural workforce, down
from 29.1% in 1974. U.S. unions also showed an absolute decline in membership
between 1974 and 1976 of 346,000.
4
Labour Organizations in Canada, 1976-1977, supra note 1, at Table 1. In 1958
34.2% of the workforce was unionized. This figure declined to a low of 29.4% in 1964
and did not reach 34% again until 1972 (34.6%).
5 See Bain, Union Growth and Public Policy in Canada (Ottawa, Lab. Can. 1978)
at 12. See also The Current Industrial Relations Scene in Canada, 1978, supra note 2,
at 257.
6 Many public employee statutes, especially those dealing with teachers, provide for
compulsory union membership: see for example Teachers" Collective Bargaining Act,
S.N.S. 1974, c. 32 and The School Boards and Teachers' Collective Negotiations Act,
S.O. 1975, c. 72. Under other public employee collective bargaining regimes which
employ more traditional certification procedures, there was a long history of membership, often compulsory, in staff associations and the transition to unionization was not
difficult. The increase in unionization in the public sector is of enormous significance
but it is not indicative of a general trend to unionization among Canadian white collar
workers, nor is it evidence that the Canadian system works in attracting unorganized
workers to collective bargaining.
7
See Bain, supra note 5, at 10, Table IV. These and other reasons for pessimism
about current trends are identified by Bain, op. cit.
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Service sectors of the economy like finance, insurance and retail trade
give particular cause for concern. They are very lightly unionized in absolute
terms and have shown themselves to be highly resistant to unionization over
the years.8 Furthermore, these sectors are growing in relation to the economy
as a whole at the expense of more densely unionized sectors like construction
and manufacturing. 9 Therefore, if they continue to show relatively low rates
of unionization, the total percentage of Canadian workers unionized cannot
fail to decline.
One obvious answer to the dilemma posed by the statistics is to "organize
the unorganized." This, however, is not a simple matter. Organized labour,
so often stigmatized as "dues-hungry," would not ignore such a large sector
unless there were very real obstacles in the path of organizing these sectors
of the economy. These obstacles must be identified and removed before the
organizing task can be successful.
This paper is a case study in organizing a segment of a hard-core unorganized sector: the chartered banks of Canada. Serious organizing efforts
have been underway in the banks for approximately three years; 10 it should
be possible to assess the campaign and extract, albeit tentatively, some general
conclusions from it. Particular attention will be paid to an evaluation of the
extent to which the law plays a role in promoting or retarding organization
among the unorganized. This paper will also suggest ways in which the law
could operate more effectively.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND
Banking Structure
There are currently ten chartered banks in Canada, functioning through
a very widespread network of small branches. 1 While some of these banks
are localized, and several are small, the "Big Five," which control ninety-one
percent of total bank assets, operate throughout Canada.12 Organization is
highly centralized, with most important decisions emanating from the head
offices in either Toronto or Montreal. Most have provincial or regional administrative subdivisions as well.
8 Bain's figures show increases in union density in these sectors from 1961 to 1975:
the density in finance, insurance and real estate, for example, increased from .2% to
1.4%, and in trade from 5.3% to 9.3% (supra note 5, Table IV). These increases are
not insignificant but they do not represent a breakthrough. Union density in finance,
for example, compares unfavourably with agriculture (5.3%) which in most jurisdictions is excluded from the coverage of labour legislation.
9 Bain, supra note 5, at 13 n. 24.
10 SORWUC began organizing in mid-1976 and made its first application for certification on August 16, 1976. CUBE had applied for certification for its first branches
a few days earlier, on August 6, 1976. Many observers feel, however, that "serious"
organizing did not begin until the June 10, 1977 decision recognizing the branch as an
appropriate unit.
"1At the time of the initial certification, there were over 7,500 branches among
eleven chartered banks.
12 They are the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada,
Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Toronto-Dominion Bank.
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Banking is a highly regulated industry. Chartered banks are required by
law to exchange cheques and balance other inter-bank transactions daily, and
to maintain a certain level of reserves in the Bank of Canada to back their
deposits.' 3 This legal framework involves close and sensitive monitoring on
a daily basis of the entire national picture, and largely accounts for the remarkably high degree of centralized decision-making and national uniformity
of conditions and methods of operation that characterize the industry.
Bank employment patterns are changing slowly in response to changing
social and economic conditions, but in general they still reflect the policies of
an earlier era. Banks employ a remarkably high percentage of women in comparison with the Canadian labour force as a whole: in 1975 the figure was
seventy-two percent. 14 These women are heavily concentrated in low-paying,
routine clerical jobs. The Bank of Nova Scotia indicates that while between
eighty and ninety percent of its management employees are male, ninety percent of its clerical employees are female. 15 This profile is typical of the industry as a whole. Comparative male/female salary levels reflect this difference in functions.
Working conditions in the banks are fairly typical of "white-collar"
employment. There has been in the past a high measure of job security;
whether increasing automation of clerical functions will change this is not yet
apparent. There is a high turnover rate, which the banks estimate variously
at between twenty-seven and thirty-six percent. 16 Since turnover is confined
largely to clerical (and therefore female) ranks, the figure for this class of
employee would be even higher. Compensation levels for clerical employees
are somewhat lower than the average for clerical work across all industries in
Canada,17 and this is probably true for management employees as well.

'3 They are subject to the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1 and the Bills of Exchange
Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5.
14 Data on bank employment practices is taken largely from Bossen, Manpower
Utilization in Canadian CharteredBanks (Royal Commission on the Status of Women,
Study No. 4, 1971) and Bossen, Employment in Chartered Banks, 1969-1975 (Ottawa,
n. p., 1976).
15 Rank of Nova Scotia, Port Dover, Simcoe and Jarvis Branches (1977) 21 di 439
at 453, 77 C.L.L.C. 16,090 at 534. The case also appears at [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R.
126 but the portion referred to is not included in the judgment. [Hereinafter Port
Dover.]
16 The Royal estimates turnover at 33-36%: see Transcript of Proceedings,
SORWUC and Royal Bank, Gibsons Branch, Board File: 555-783, testimony of Gordon
Yule at 129. The Commerce estimates its turnover rate at 27%, its female turnover rate
at 31% and its male at 15%: see Transcript of Proceedings, SORWUC and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Victory Square Branch, Board File: 555-614, testi-

mony of Philip Cotton at 249. The Bank of Nova Scotia's figures are 35% clerical
turnover and 16% management turnover: see Port Dover, supra note 15.
17 A study for the chartered banks estimated that bank salaries for female clerical
employees are approximately 4% below those in all industries generally in Canada, and
approximately 12% below salaries for unionized female clerical employees in all industries. Burns-Fry Ltd., Investment Notes: Labour Unions and the Chartered Banks (n. p.,
1978) at 7. [Hereinafter Burns-Fry Study.]
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History of Bank Organizing
The chartered banks have been notoriously resistant to trade unionism,
and there have been only sporadic attempts to organize them over the years.
It was not until 1959 that the Canada Labour Relations Board received its
first application for certification from a union seeking to represent bank employees. The Kitimat, Terrace and District General Workers' Union, Local
1583 applied for a unit of three workers among a total staff of five in the
Kitimat branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia.18 The bank contested the application on the grounds that the unit was not appropriate for collective bargaining, taking the position that only a national unit would be appropriate.
Although the application was dismissed on the basis that the unit was not
appropriate, the Board was careful to point out that it was not accepting the
argument that only a national unit would be suitable: "It may well be that
units of some of the employees of a Bank, grouped together territorially or on
some other basis, will prove to be appropriate, rather than a nation-wide
unit."'10 It was clear, however, that a branch was not an appropriate unit.
This decision understandably daunted the trade union movement. In
1959 the Royal Bank had 503 branches nationally and presented a truly
formidable organizing task. The task became even more formidable as
branches proliferated with the passage of time. Although the Kitimat decision
hinted at some more manageable unit, none was readily apparent since the
administration of bank personnel was, in fact, largely handled at the national
level, as the bank had argued. The response of the trade union movement to
decision was virtually to suspend organizing for about fifteen
the Kitimat
20
years.
Outside of the chartered banks, some progress was being made in the
financial sector. In 1967 the Office and Professional Employees International
Union (OPEIU) was certified to represent all the employees of the Montreal
and District Savings Bank. 21 This bank had seventy-five branches at the time,
all in the Montreal area, and presented a manageable organizing task. z2 The
1979 round of negotiations saw the first strike, which lasted only two days.
The majority of the nationally chartered banks, however, pose labour relations problems of a different magnitude, as both the labour movement and
the banks recognized.
In 1972 the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), recognizing the serious
threat to the labour movement posed by an unorganized and expanding

B.

18Bank of Nova Scotia, Kitimat (1959),

59 C.L.L.C.

18,152. [Hereinafter

Kitimat.)
19 Id. at 1799.
20
An application for a unit of IBM operators in the Banque Canadienne Nationale
is the only exception. See La Banque Canadienne Nationale (1967), 67 C.L.L.C.
16,010. (Can. L.R.B.)
2
1For historical reasons this institution is not chartered under the Bank Act; it

operates under its own federal statute, the Quebec Savings Bank Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
B-4.
22 Montreal City and District Savings Bank is exceptional for another reason as
well; it had a functioning staff association since 1920. See "Montreal City and District
Savings Bank Breaks Strike Ground", Canada Labour Views Report, February 19, 1979.
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"white-collar" work force, launched a widely publicized campaign to organize
the financial sector. It chartered a series of locals under the umbrella of the
Association of Commercial and Technical Employees (ACTE) to carry the
Congress banner, and instituted a two cent per capita per month levy to fund
the drive. After making some sporadic forays into insurance companies and
related institutions, the ACTE campaign broke, largely on the twin rocks of
inter-union jurisdictional squabbles and bureaucratic myopia. ACTE organizers complained that, despite the large "war chest," ACTE was kept shortstaffed and starved for funds, and ceased organizing long before its projected
five year life-span was up.23 It had a negligible impact on the low union
density statistics for the financial sector.
Aside from a sprinkling of provincial certifications held by various
unions in trust companies and credit unions, the financial sector in 1976 was
still virgin territory for the labour movement. The chartered banks presented
a challenge that no Congress affiliate was prepared to confront in any
effective way.
C.

SORWUC and CUBE

If unions did not appear to be very interested in bank workers, at least
some bank workers were interested in unions. This interest crystallized
independently in two parts of the country: Ontario and British Columbia. In
mid-1976 the first applications for branch certification since Kitimat were
filed.
When clerical women in the Bank of Nova Scotia and the Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce in Simcoe, Port Dover and Jarvis, Ontario were
ready for union representation, they turned, not to a CLC affiliate with
established jurisdiction in the field of clerical employment, but to the
fledgling Canadian Chemical Workers' Union (CCWU), recently formed by
the breakaway Canadian membership of the International Chemical Workers'
Union. The reasons for their choice were somewhat arbitrary. The union was
in the news at the time because of the publicity surrounding its recent breakaway. 24 Perhaps more significant, the husband of one of the bank workers
was a CCWU steward.25 Certainly the CCWU had no mission to organize
bank workers, or any particular commitment to organizing women. Nevertheless, it agreed to supervise these particular applications for certification,
while intending, from the first, to turn the units over to some more appropriate
union if they were certified. Meanwhile, separate applications for certification
were filed with the Canada Labour Relations Board (CLRB) by locals of the
CCWU for three branches of the Bank of Nova Scotia and one branch of the
Commerce. Only when it became apparent that the CCWU might be con23
See "Decade of Good Relations for Union, Bank", The Globe and Mail, September 4, 1978 at 11. ACTE is still alive and holds a few certificates across the country.
An ACTE local made an unsuccessful application for certification for a Sudbury, Ontario branch of the Bank of Montreal.
24 "History Made as First Bank Contract Ratified", Ontario Labour, Nov./Dec.
1978 at 9.
25 See Lowe, The Canadian Union of Bank Employees (Toronto, n.p., 1978) at 12.
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stitutionally incapable of representing bank employees was the Canadian
Union of Bank Employees (CUBE) formed. 20 Applications were refiled in
the name of the new union, and these applications were finally heard by the
CLRB in May of 1977.
The history of the Service, Office and Retail Workers' Union of Canada
(SORWUC) and its contact with bank workers is quite different.2 7 This
union was an outgrowth of the Vancouver women's liberation movement, and
was founded in 1972 by the Working Women's Association (WWA), a
feminist labour support group. Although WWA members were working
women, in general they worked in unorganized workplaces. Their contacts
with the trade union movement had been uniformly negative. One member,
who worked as a typist in an insurance company at the time, reports contacting
the Office and Technical Employees' Union, the west coast local of OPEIU,
for assistance in organizing her office. She was told that all employees in
insurance companies had access to confidential information and therefore
were ineligible to unionize. Another who worked in a chain restaurant was
able to persuade an established union to accept an already signed-up unit
for the purpose of an application for certification, but the union backed off
when management fired the organizers. The waitresses had to turn to the
WWA for help. These and similar experiences convinced them that traditional
unions were both uninterested in organizing women workers and insensitive
to women's problems in the workplace. They felt that there was a pressing
need for a union organized and controlled by women and committed to
organizing places where women worked.
The SORWUC approach represented a marked departure from traditional union jurisdictional behaviour. The union sought certifications whereever women worked: in restaurants, offices (including a law office), credit
unions, day care centres, social service agencies, a community radio station
and a university student union. In 1976, prior to its bank organizing efforts, it
held twelve certifications, all in the Vancouver area, and had approximately
150 active members. It depended then, as now, largely on volunteer labour
and contributions from sympathizers in the trade union movement to fund
and administer its organizing efforts.
Although bank workers are mainly women and, thus, are part of
SORWUC's natural jurisdiction, the union did not move into the banking
field immediately. However, in the spring of 1976 it campaigned with leaflets
in Vancouver's downtown area, inviting contact from clerical women interested in organizing. There was a strong response from bank workers and
the union decided to follow up on these contacts made in the various branches.
SORWUC and its legal advisors were not at all confident that the CLRB
would accept an individual bank branch as a unit appropriate for collective
26 Id. at 14.
27 Information on SORWUC is gathered from Bank Book Collective An Account
to Settle: The Story of the United Bank Workers (SORWUC) (Vancouver: Press Gang
Pub., 1979), and from personal interviews with Jean Rands and Jackie Ainsworth,
long-time SORWUC members and officers.
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bargaining, although that was always a possibility. The main purpose in
applying for a number of branch units was something rather different. First
of all, SORWUC felt that a strong argument could be made that the CLRB,
even if it refused to certify a branch unit, was obliged to respond to an
application for certification by defining the unit that was appropriate for collective bargaining. 28 A branch application was a way of stating a case to the
Board on the question left open in Kitimat. If that question were answered
definitively, future organizing, on whatever basis, would not have to take
place in a legal vacuum, and bank workers would at least know that it was
legal for them to unionize-a question on which there appears to have been
some doubt even in the minds of union officials.n SORWUC's guess was that
the Board would declare the region to be the appropriate unit. Secondly, the
union felt that putting a large number of branch applications before the Board
would have a tactical significance in demonstrating to the Board that the
sentiment for unionization in the banks was not just an isolated phenomenon,
thereby placing pressure on it to make a decision that would give that sentiment some scope to develop. It would also build momentum for the allprovince organizing drive that the union anticipated would be desirable, if
not necessary, after the Board's decision.
The strategy was, then, to assemble as many applications for certification
as possible and to file them in rapid succession. The first was an application
for employees at the Victory Square branch of the Canadian Imperial Bank
of Commerce in Vancouver, filed on August 16, 1976. Sixteen more branches
of various banks applied before the end of 1976. Momentum dropped somewhat after that, but SORWUC had filed a total of twenty-two applications for
certification before the first hearings were held in April of 1977.
A special bank workers' local, Local 2, was formed in September of
1976 and became known as the United Bank Workers. Even after the formation of Local 2, however, certification applications continued to be made in
the name of the national body, SORWUC, and the name "United Bank
Workers" does not figure prominently in this history.
D.

Impetus to Organize
The question of why groups of bank workers on opposite sides of the
country decided independently to file applications for certification at the
same time is not easy to answer. The campaign was certainly not sparked by
any new factor introduced into the nation-wide system. Predictably, however,
there were common grievances, some of which were aggravated by factors
peculiar to the historical moment at which the applications were filed.
The major grievance identified by both the Ontario and British Columbia
groups was low wages.30 An independent study financed by the banks found
28CanadaLabour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am. by S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 125(1).

29 An organizer for OTEU, a local of OPEIU, was reported to have said after the
SORWUC applications were filed that it was contrary to the Bank Act for bank workers
to unionize. See An Account to Settle, supra note 27 at 24.
30 See e.g., Lowe, supra note 25, and An Account to Settle, supra note 27.
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that bank clerical wages were about four percent below the national average
for female clerical employees. 31 Bank clerks were aware of this disparity, but
such fairly marginal differences were not the focus of their complaints. At
least, as perceived by SORWUC and its members, the issue of wages in the
banks was only one aspect of the much broader issue of women's wages in
Canadian society. The fact that the wage rates in the banks were "competitive"
was completely irrelevant to women organized around this issue. Their
ultimate goal was not parity with other female clerks, or even unionized
female clerks; it was the much more revolutionary goal of parity with male
workers. Viewed from this perspective, the enormous wage increase demanded by SORWUC in its first contract-an increase in the base rate from
$600 to $1,140 per month-was not "capricious,"3 although it may well have
been outside the realm of rational expectation.
The wage problem was exacerbated at the time of the unionization drive
by the federal wage control guidelines. Salary ceilings increased the frustrations of low wage earners everywhere in Canada in a time of galloping
inflation, but bank clerks' frustrations were increased even more by their
conviction that the banks were simply using the guidelines as a cover for their
traditional policy of exploiting a weak and divided female work force.3 3
34
A second significant issue was sex discrimination within the banks.
Women resented having to train young male employees who received more
pay than they did even while in training. The trainees would then move on
to higher positions to which their "teachers" had no access. They also resented
the fact that the more desirable, more highly paid positions invariably went to
men who were just "passing through" rather than to experienced and competent women who had a permanent commitment to the branch. Women did
not always want access to the formal training programmes, although the
systematic exclusion of women "from the ranks" from these programmes was a
not inconsiderable grievance. More often, they simply objected to the fact
that seniority counted for nothing in the bank promotion policies affecting
clerical workers.
Discrimination against women employees has been a characteristic of
banking since its birth, and women had accepted it as part of the immutable
rerum naturum. There is no doubt that the women's movement and the concomitant increase in women's employment expectations must be largely
credited with aggravating these grievances. The situation for women in banks,
at least in terms of promotion opportunities, was improving, but opportunities
were not expanding as rapidly as the consciousness of female employees.
The issues and the will to collective action were there, but it is no
accident that the first breakthroughs in the banking industry were made by
unions that were not part of the established trade union movement. It would

31

Burns-Fry Study, supra note 17 at 7.

32 Id. at 8.
33 See Lowe,
34

Id.at 10.

supra note 25, at 12-3.
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be a mistake to overemphasize the similarities between CUBE and SORWUC;
their histories were very different, as were their reasons for operating outside
the mainstream of the Canadian labour movement. 35 They had at least something in common: as unions functioning outside the Canadian Labour
Congress, they had no jurisdictional inhibitions and no incentive to send bank
workers who were ripe for unionization to established unions which might be
less receptive to them. Furthermore, at least in the case of SORWUC, there
were two additional ingredients: a passionate commitment to organizing
the unorganized and a conviction that working women have as much right
to union representation as working men. CLC unions with a claim to bank
jurisdiction gave every indication of accepting the Kitimat decision as the
death certificate for bank unionization. The only unions prepared to take the
risk of another failure were those that had little to lose by it.
E.

The Victory Square Decision
Prior to the advent of bank organizing the Canada Labour Relations
Board had enjoyed a relatively tranquil existence. Operating in a narrow
jurisdiction among industries with stable, long-term collective bargaining
relationships, it was unused to controversy. It recognized the SORWUC
and CUBE applications for the political time bombs that they were. Hesitant
to commit itself in an area that would clearly have far reaching implications,
the Board followed the course of simply delaying the scheduling of these
cases. Admittedly there was little pressure, at least in the initial months, from
either side. The banks were happy if the matter were never heard. Delay
also served the SORWIUC strategy of accumulating applications before the
hearings.
To do the Board justice, it had no reason to believe at the time that
delay would have much effect on the success or failure of the applications.
The union had majority membership in most of the units for which it had
applied, and, under the prevailing Board jurisprudence, this would have been
sufficient to ensure certification regardless of when the matter was heard. The
intervention of a Federal Court decision changing this rule could not have
been forseen3 6 Nevertheless, delay, among other evils, could have been
expected to undermine union support at the bargaining table. The time lag
of more than eight months between the initial application and the first hearing
was scarcely an auspicious beginning to what has proved to be a troubled
relationship between the CLRB, the banks and the bank unions.
The delay might have been even longer without the intervention of the
Federal Court decision; the CLRB, galvanized into action, in April, 1977
heard SORWUIJC's applications for units in the Bank of Commerce. In May,

a5 The Canadian Chemical Workers Union, the CUBE parent, split from the International Chemical Workers Union over the issue of merger with the Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers. It could not join the CLC because of the ban on dual unions. It
merged
with the Teamsters, also a non-CLC union, in January of 1979.
36
CKOY Ltd. v. Ottawa Newspaper Guild, Loc. 205, [1977] 2 F.C. 412, 74 D.L.R.
(3d) 229, 77 C.L.L.C. 14,093 (C.A.). [Hereinafter CKOY.]
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CUBE's applications were heard. Finally, in twin decisions dated June 10,
1977,' 7 the CLRB declared that a single branch of a chartered bank was a
unit appropriate for collective bargaining.
In the wake of these decisions, the banks became enormously concerned
about the implications of collective bargaining. Confronted with headlines
like "Canada faces a vast, new wave of unionism,"38 the Canadian Bankers'
Association retained a firm of economic consultants 0 to study the effects of
unionism on banks. Programmes were implemented or accelerated to hear
employee grievances 40 and to update benefit packages, wage levels were in41
creased, and annual reports hastened to reassure shareholders.
The anticipated organizing explosion has not yet materialized, however.
To date, after almost three years of organizing, only slightly over 100 of over
7,500 branches have been organized, and more than twenty-five percent of
these are no longer certified. The reasons for this dismal success rate are
many and complicated. A hypothesis worth exploring is that at least some of
the responsibility lies with Canadian labour laws and the CLRB for failing
to meet the challenge posed by hard-core unorganized sectors. To test this
hypothesis, it is helpful to take a detailed look at the legal response to problems raised by bank labour relations.
III. THE UNIONS VERSUS THE BANKS: THE LAW IN OPERATION
A. The Appropriate Unit
The Board's decision in Victory Square42 to allow unions to organize
banks on a branch-by-branch basis represents a very precarious resolution of
some profound conflicts in public policy. The Canada Labour Code directs
that "where a trade union applies ...for certification as the bargaining agent
for a unit that the trade union considers appropriate for collective bargaining,
the Board shall determine the unit that, in the opinion of the Board, is appropriate for collective bargaining. 43 Generally speaking, there had been a
shift in public policy in Canada over the preceeding few years in favour of
large bargaining units. The competing considerations are stated succinctly
by the British Columbia Labour Relations Board in Insurance Corporation
of British Columbia:
[T]here is a tension between the two uses of the bargaining unit. On the one hand,
the scope of the unit is the key to securing trade union representation and collec-

37 CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce (1977), 20 di 319, [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R.
99, 77 C.L.L.C. 16,089 [Hereinafter Victory Square], and Port Dover, supra note 15.
38 Vancouver Province, June 20, 1977.
39 Burns-Fry Ltd. Supra note 17.
40 See Speirs, "Tellers Unite!", Ottawa Citizen, April 22, 1978; Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce, Annual Report, 1977 at 18. The Annual Report does not discuss
the motivation for improved benefits.
41
Annual Report, id.
42
Supranote 37.
43 Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am. by S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 125(1).
[Hereinafter Code.]
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tive bargaining rights for the employees. Since this is the fundamental purpose of
the Code, the Board's definition must be such as to facilitate organization of the
employees. On the other hand, that unit sets the framework for actual bargaining
for a long time into the future. A structure is needed which is conducive to
voluntary settlements without strikes and will minimize the disruptive effects of the
of experience is that these
latter when they do occur. Unfortunately, the lesson
44
two objectives often point in different directions.

These words were written out of a turbulent labour relations environment
which graphically demonstrated the need for comprehensive, all-employer
bargaining units if possible: endless rounds of bargaining for the employer,
whip-saw contracts, domino strikes and frequent raiding are only a few of the
effects of fragmentation. The CLRB has been faced within the last few years
with complex situations in45which it opted for all-employer rather than single
location bargaining units.
In many ways, SORWUC's application was typical. The union's choice
of single branch unit was made strictly on pragmatic grounds, and the employer's choice of national unit was equally pragmatically based, but the
policy trend discussed above might well have suggested that the Board would
embrace the employer's position.
The bank's argument that a branch unit was not appropriate for collective bargaining was not without an objective basis. 40 The business enterprise is a highly centralized one; detailed data on every business transaction
must be fed into head office on a daily basis. Uniformity in methods and
procedures necessarily requires a significant degree of uniformity in personnel
policies.
As the Board points out, "hiring, assessment, promotion, discipline and
termination are usually initiated at the branch level because the bank has to
rely on its managers in its many locations." 47 In fact, however, there is
virtually no role for the branch to play beyond this initiatory one, since policy
is invariably made and ratified at higher levels. Obviously this was a situation
in which a bargaining unit coinciding with one of the employer's larger
administrative units would be a more desirable one.
This was certainly the argument made by the employer. In the first
branch of its argument, the bank advanced general labour relations values

44 [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 403 at 407, 75 C.L.L.C. 16,146 at 1142 (B.C.L.R.B.).
[Hereinafter 1CBC.]
45
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., (1977), 25 di 377, [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 92,
78 C.L.L.C. 16,128; B.C. Telephone Co. (1977), 33 di 361, [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R.
385, 77 C.L.L.C. 16,107; Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1977), 21 di 388, [1977] 1 Can.
L.R.B.R. 510, 77 C.L.L.C. 16,104.
46 The details of this discussion relate to the Commerce, but at least with respect
to the Bank of Nova Scotia, counsel for the employer conceded that the fact situations
were "different only in a modest degree": see Port Dover, supra note 15. On the basis
of the organizational structures outlined in the reported decisions, this concession
appears to be valid for all the "Big Five".
47 Victory Square, supra note 37, at 343 (di), 117 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 518 (C.L.L.C.).
[Emphasis added.]
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that would be promoted by a larger unit: administrative efficiency, increased
lateral mobility for employees, the desirability of common employment conditions, and a reduction in industrial unrest.4 8 These considerations might
be applicable to any large employer operating at a number of locations under
tightly centralized control.
The second branch of the argument was more specifically tied to the
nature of banking. As the argument is summarized in the Board's decision:
"The role of the banking industry and its high degree of government regulation is said to be such that the industry should be viewed as a monopoly
'49
sanctioned by government with each bank as a quasi-public institution.
The public interest, it was argued, was very closely enmeshed with the whole
question of branch unionization: "[It] would affect the property rights of
all Canadians, i.e., their right to deposit and withdraw money, and would
disrupt the mechanism our society relies upon for the money necessary to
sustain all elements of society." 50 The Board should show a special solicitude
for stability in such a key sector; to allow branch certification would be to
introduce "utter chaos" into the banking industry which is the "fiscal fibre"
of our nation. 51
It is in this second branch of its argument-this parade of what the
Board characterizes as "hypothetical horribles"52 that the bank reveals
what could be viewed as the true basis for its objection to branch certification.
If branch certification would introduce utter chaos into our "fiscal fibre,"
would not national certification bring the whole payments system to the brink
of the abyss? A strike in a branch or in a few branches could be contained.
Alternative methods of doing business could undoubtedly be devised. A
strike on a national level, however, would inevitably bring the whole elaborate
structure to a halt. To argue for a national unit in order to protect the property rights of Canadians seems totally misconceived, unless the intent is, as
it surely was, to persuade the Board to agree to a unit so broad as to ensure
that no union would ever be able to organize it.
The Board refused to accept the bank's position. In a diametric reversal
of its earlier Kitimat58 ruling, it found a single branch to be a unit appropriate
for collective bargaining. It recognized the tensions noted in Insurance
CorpY4 between small units which favour the policy of fostering organization
and large units which favour the policy of fostering more rational bargaining
structures. However, it took its guidance from the Preamble to the Canada

48 Id. at 346 (di), 119 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 520 (C.L.L.C.). These are the criteria
suggested in ICBC, supra note 44, at 408-12 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 1142-46 (C.L.L.C.), that
direct the Board towards a larger unit.
49 Id. at 347 (di), 120 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 521 (C.L.L.C.).
GO Id. at 347 (di), 120 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 520 (C.L.L.C.).
51 Id.
2

6 1d. at 351 (di), 123 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 523 (C.L.L.C.).

53 Supra note 18.
5

4 Supra note 44.
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Labour Code,5 5 which it read as a strong statement in favour of promoting
collective bargaining:
The express intention of Parliament is the "encouragement of free collective bargaining" and to support labour and management who recognize and support
collective bargaining "as the bases of effective industrial relations for the determination of good working conditions and sound labour management relations".
Parliament also "deems the development of good industrial relations to be itthe
best interests of Canada in ensuring a just share of the fruits of progress to all."r,(

Fostering organization, it concluded, should be the overriding consideration
where there is irreconcilable conflict between the two policies since, without
organization, there can be no collective bargaining:
This legislative intent can best be achieved by facilitating collective bargaining for
employees who choose this procedure for settling the terms and conditions of
employment. That can be accomplished by this Board accepting or fashioning
bargaining units that give employees a realistic possibility of exercising their rights
under the Code. Too large units in unorganized industries will abort any possibility of collective
bargaining ever commencing and defeat this express intention of
5
Parliament. 7

This decision represents a genuine breakthrough in Canadian labour
policy. It was not, of course, without its harbingers. The British Columbia
Board qualified its generally pro-large unit philosophy in words prophetic
of the bank situation:
Most discussions of the nature of an appropriate unit concentrate on ...the longterm structure. However, clearly one can't have collective bargaining at all unless
there is a unit in which a majority of employees will select a trade union's representative [sic]. There are certain types of employees who are traditionally difficult
to organize and there are some employers who are willing to exploit that fact and
stimulate opposition to a representation campaign. If, notwithstanding these obstacles, a group of employees within a viable unit wishes to have a union represent
them, this Board will exercise its discretion in order to get collective bargaining
under way. In that kind of situation, it makes no sense to stick rigidly to a con-

55 The Preamble to Part V of the Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, reads as
follows:
Whereas there is a long tradition in Canada of labour legislation and policy
designed for the promotion of the common well-being through the encouragement
of free collective bargaining and the constructive settlement of disputes;
And Whereas Canadian workers, trade unions and employers recognize and
support freedom of association and free collective bargaining as the bases of
effective industrial relations for the determination of good working conditions and
sound labour-management relations;
And Whereas the Government of Canada has ratified Convention No. 87 of
the International Labour Organization concerning Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize and has assumed international reporting
responsibilities in this regard;
And Whereas the Parliament of Canada desires to continue and extend its
support to labour and management in their cooperative efforts to develop good
relations and constructive collective bargaining practices, and deems the development of good industrial relations to be in the best interests of Canada in ensuring
a just share of the fruits of progress to all;
Now Therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: ....
56 Victory Square, supra note 37, at 348 (di), 121 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 521 (C.L.L.C.).
57
Id.at 348-49 (di), 121 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 521 (C.L:L.C.).
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ception of the best bargaining unit in the long term, when the effect of that
attitude is to abort the representation effort from the outset.58

The Ontario Labour Relations Board scooped the CLRB by mere days in the
financial sector by certifying CUBE to represent the employees of a single
branch of Canada Trustco, a trust company with a number of branches
throughout the province. 59
Furthermore, the criteria traditionally employed by the CLRB for unit
determination allow for consideration of whether the proposed unit is too
large to be realistically organized. In Canadian Pacific Ltd.60 the Board
discussed in detail the circumstances in which it would consent to "fragment"
an all-employer unit. Citing the by-now familiar British Columbia authority,
it noted that "[s]pecific industries where employees have difficulty in resorting
to collective bargaining" 6' warrant special treatment of this kind.
In applying this philosophy, the Board does not require that a larger
unit be impossible to organize; a significant degree of difficulty is sufficient.
This is made clear by the result, if not the language, of later decisions in
which the Board was faced with the argument that a regional rather than a
national unit was the appropriate one. The first of these is Royal Bank of
Canada,Gibsons Branch.62 This was the first incursion by any union into the
Royal Bank and the employer, following on the heels of the failure of other
"Big Five" banks to convince the Board that a national unit was the only
appropriate one, took the more moderate approach that a regional unit was
the only appropriate one.63 It was not a position of strength, since it would
have been open to the Board on its own initiative in the earlier cases to opt
for a regional unit if it had been so disposed. However, the Royal Bank bolstered its position with the novel argument that the Code did not allow the
Board to pick and choose from among a multiplicity of possible appropriate
units: it required the Board to ascertain which was most appropriate, 64 and
to certify for that unit alone. That unit in the banking industry, it argued,
was the regional unit, which met "the competing interests of bargaining unit
determination, namely, long term stable labour relations and facilitating collective bargaining, and the Board's preference for larger bargaining units." 65

5S Supra note 44.
59 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. 330 at 334, [1977] 2 Can.
L.R.B.R. 93 at 97.
CO(1976), 13 di 13, [1976] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 361, 76 C.L.L.C. 16,018. [Hereinafter
C.P. Ltd.]
6lId. at 31(di), 368 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 493 (C.L.L.C.).
62 (1977), 26 di 509, [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 326. [Hereinafter Gibsons #1.]
63 While the rest of the "Big Five" were all represented by the same Toronto law
firm, the Royal employed separate Montreal counsel. The Royal's position may have
been dictated by the fact that it was differently advised rather than by the fact that the
other banks had already lost the battle for the national unit.
64 The argument in Gibsons #1 was based primarily on the use of the definite
article in s. 125(1) of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 62, at 518 (di), 332 (Can.
L.R.B.R.).
65 Supra note 62, at 518 (di), 332 (Can. L.R.B.R.).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 1 8, No. 2

The argument that the region was appropriate and the branch inappropriate was not, by this time, without some basis in bargaining history.
This case was heard some months after the Victory Square decision.A0 In
its original reply to the Gibsons application, the employer had been prepared
to concede the appropriateness of the unit on the basis of the earlier decisions.
It changed its position only after SORWUC made public its decision to
attempt to negotiate a master contract covering all its certified branches in
British Columbia. 7 The employer asked the Board to infer from SORWUC's
decision that the union itself recognized the inappropriateness of the branch
bargaining unit.
The Board rejected the employer's statutory argument that it was
compelled to find the most appropriate unit. It then concluded that there
was no reason to prefer the region over the branch in this case. Although the
task of organizing a regional unit might be "less impossible," 8 it was still
formidable:
To require employees of this employer in two hundred and three locations to act
in concert in order to exercise that freedom would not only, as a practical matter,
restrict their freedom of choice of a trade union, but would also effectively negate
any realistic possibility of exercising the freedom granted in section 110(1).09

The "impossibility" criterion is watered down even further in BanqueProvinciale du Canada,70 where the employer advocated the appropriateness
of a regional rather than a branch unit. In a bank operating only in the
province of Quebec, however, the region in question consisted of only fortytwo branches in a relatively confined geographic area. Nevertheless, the
Board's response is the now-familiar one: to certify the branch. This decision
appears to be the Board's announcement that no matter what the structure
of a particular bank, a branch will be an appropriate unit because it is easier
to organize.
The branch decision, designed to allow unions to gain access to the
banking industry, has in fact yielded mixed fruit. There is now a sprinkling
of collective agreements across the country, but employees have made no
spectacular gains by them. Unorganized employees of the banks enjoy better
wages and working conditions than ever before. No one can quarrel with this,
but it scarcely promotes the policies of the Code. Most of the units that were
certified in the first year of organizing have since had their certificates revoked,
possibly because the pressure generated by trying to bargain effectively for
a branch contract was too great. The question must be asked: was the branch
certification decision a mistake?
66

The first two decisions (Victory Square and CUBE and Bank of Nova Scotia)
came down on June 10, 1977. Gibsons #1 was heard on October 18-20, 1977.
07 Gibsons #1, supra note 62, at 511 (di), 327 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
68d. at 522 (di), 335 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
69 Id. at 522 (di), 336 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
The reference to "choice of trade union" indicates the Board's perception that while
a more established and better financed trade union might take on this organizing task,
SORWUC could not. It is worth noting that a similar argument based on freedom of
association was made but given no consideration in the Kitimat case.
70 Unreported decision, Board File: 555-1013. [Hereinafter Banque Provinciale.]
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The Royal Bank challenged the decision before the Federal Court of
Canada. In what the Court characterizes as its "only substantial ground of
attack," 71 the bank argued that the Board had based its decision on an
erroneous perception that the public policy of Canada was to further collective
bargaining. The Court upheld the Board's decision, but it is difficult to tell

whether it agrees or disagrees with the fundamental basis of that decision. The
Court's judgment is worth quoting at length:
There is no doubt that certain passages of the Reasons of the Board are so drafted
as to lend some support to the Applicant's argument. This is regrettable since the
duty of the Board is neither to facilitate nor to hinder the certification of Unions.
However, a careful reading of the whole of the Reasons shows, in our view, that
what the Board meant to say in those passages was merely that its discretion
under section 125(2) of the Code was to be exercised so as to give the employees,
in so far as possible, "a realistic possibility of exercising their rights under the
Code." So understood, the decision of the Board, is in our opinion, unimpeachable. 72

This passage can only be described as delphic. It is beyond rational dispute
that the Board's decision was dictated by what it perceived to be its mission,
imposed by the Preamble and scheme of the Code, to promote collective
bargaining. If the Court rejected this interpretation of the Code it ought surely
to have quashed the decision.
In any case, the decision of the Board stands as the law of the bank
cases: branch certification is legally unimpeachable. Is it equally unimpeachable from a policy point of view? It has certainly not had the dramatic effect
on organizing that was anticipated. It may even result, after an initial flurry
of organizing activity, in retarding bank organizing if workers and unions
become demoralized about the frustrations of organizing and bargaining on a
branch basis. The branch decision may not even have been absolutely necessary to give the unions an entry into the banks: SORWUC certainly didn't
think so. These hypotheticals are still untested, and it is certain that if the
Board had attempted to take them into consideration it would have had to
deny the particular workers who approached them any effective participation
in determining their terms and conditions of employment for the foreseeable
future. It would also have deprived them, perhaps permanently, of the representative of their choice, since neither SORWUC nor CUBE had the
resources to take on a larger scale campaign. Both of these results would
have been subversive of important principles protected by the Code.
The branch decision did, however, give the bank employees and the
labour movement maximum flexibility. While it stamped with official approval
a very unsatisfactory bargaining format, it did not tie the participants down
to that format. Thus, as all the parties anticipated, after some experience with
branch-by-branch organizing and bargaining, union organizers are seeking
broader-based units. The Victory Square73 and Gibsons #174 decisions go
71

Royal Bank of Canada v. SORWUC, unreported decision of the Federal Court

of Appeal, Court No. A-849-77.
72 Id. at 1-2.
7a Supranote 37.
74
Supra note 62.
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no further than deciding that a single branch is a unit appropriate for collective bargaining. They strongly imply that other units would also be
appropriate or even more appropriate. The decisions themselves, however,
give little guidance as to what lines the Board might be prepared to draw.
One subsequent decision helps to fill
Bank of Montreal, Clinton Branch,75 the
group of employees who worked in what
merely a sub-agency of a larger branch. 76
administrative relationship between branch
separate certifications.

in at least one of the blanks. In
union sought certification for a
was, at the time of the hearing,
The Board found that the close
and sub-agency militated against

Currently, union organizers appear to be searching for a unit that is
larger than a branch, yet organizationally manageable. The obvious next step
is a regional unit, which is certainly not ruled out by the Gibsons #177 and
Banque Provinciale78 cases. In fact, both of those decisions contain language
indicating the desirability of regional units. It is possible that the labour
relations role of the region may differ from bank to bank, but, on the basis of
the Board's "community of interest" criteria developed to date, it is unlikely
that a regional unit would be deemed inappropriate.
Regional certification, however, is not yet a practical possibility for
union organizers, despite SORWUC's initiative to organize British Columbia.
The quest is still for smaller units. The Board has already ruled that a data
centre of a bank is an appropriate unit, although no union has yet been
certified for one. 79 The question of the appropriateness of district offices,
chargex centres and central processing facilities was mooted in Gibsons #1,80
but the employer conceded in argument that such units would be appropriate
on their own, and in the context of branch organizing it is difficult to see how
the Board could come to any other conclusion. In a case predating the Victory
Square decision by several years, an application for a quasi-craft unit of IBM
operators engaged in clearing operations in the Banque Canadienne Nationale
was rejected as inappropriate. 81 This decision was rendered in a different
philosophical climate and, for many reasons, it was not a "clean" craft
application.8 2 Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that it would not be
followed today. The CLRB is not sympathetic to craft fragmentation, and it
serves no useful purpose that would not be better served by branch certi75 (1977), 24 di 198, [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 157.
76

At the time that the union applied for certification, the location in Clinton was
a self-contained branch. Subsequent reorganization, found not to be improperly motivated, made it a sub-agency of the Ashcroft branch. The union is now certified for a
unit comprising both the branch and the sub-agency, and has signed a contract.
7
7 Supranote 62.

78
Supra note 70.
79 One of SORWUC's initial applications was for a data centre of the Bank of

Nova Scotia. The application was dismissed when the union lost a representation vote.
80
Supra note 62, at 538 (di), 349 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
81 Supranote 20.

821be union's proposed unit did not include all IBM operators, or even all IBM
operators engaged in clearing operations. Id. at 975.
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fication. Craft-type employees excluded from branch units would, however,
undoubtedly get a more hospitable reception.
As to what groupings of branches it might consider appropriate, however, the Board has, as yet, given the unions no guidance. Possibilities include
city and metropolitan units, labour market areas, bank employee recruitment
districts, areas linked by single data centres, or even provinces. 83
The Board's magic potion for the perceived problems of bargaining for
very small units is that the parties themselves should develop by consensus
larger and more efficient bargaining structures. 84 It speaks with enthusiasm
of SORWUC's attempt to bargain a master contract in British Columbia. 85
This, of course, is the common sense position. It overlooks, however, the fact
that, for the foreseeable future at least, positions on bargaining format will be
dictated by strategic rather than logical considerations. SORWUC's desire to
bargain in common for all branches of all banks reflected its conviction that
this was the most rational structure within which to set terms and conditions
of employment. One of the union's organizational rallying cries had been for
an end to arbitrary action, favouritism and inconsistency in working conditions This goal of uniformity would best be achieved by co-ordinated
bargaining. It equally reflected crippling financial pressure which made bargaining on a branch-by-branch basis a practical impossibility. Co-ordinated
bargaining was a practical solution to the problem of paying the bargaining
committee. The banks' refusal even to consider this proposal-a proposal that
would not only have been administratively more efficient but would also have
given them a highly desirable multi-employer bargaining contract-can only
have been motivated by a desire to obstruct effective bargaining in order to
wear the union down and discourage other employees from unionizing. In
the unit cases the banks had argued that branch-by-branch negotiating would
reduce their centralized systems to anarchy. They obviously had much to
gain by multi-branch bargaining. Yet, they were prepared to sacrifice longterm benefits for the short-term one of bankrupting SORWUC.
The parties cannot be expected to develop voluntarily rational bargaining
structures until their collective bargaining relationship matures. The paradox
is that, at least in this case, the relationship will never mature unless more
rational bargaining structures are developed. It may simply wither and die.
The Board made the right decision in sanctioning branch certification, but it
must do more. It has already served notice that in difficult-to-organize industries it will take a continuing interest in unit determination: "The Board,
83By way of analogy, the NLRB has certified units such as these in the insurance
industry in the U.S., an industry organized on lines somewhat similar to Canadian
banking: see Hall "The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable
Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice" (1967), 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 479, at 50412, and Abodeely The NLRB and the Appropriate BargainingUnit (Philadelphia: Univ.
of Penn. Press, 1971).
84 Victory Square, supra note 37, at 353-54 (di), 124-25 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 524-25
(C.L.L.C.).
85 Gibsons #1,
L.R.B.R.).

supra note 62, at 517 and 522-23 (di), 332 and 336-37 (Can.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 18, NO. 2

after a while, may consider that small existing units must be enlarged or
amalgamated and will take an active part in that process. '80 Such parental
supervision, as well as an imaginative approach to "combination" units proposed by trade unions, is crucial to the development of stable collective
bargaining in the industry.
B.

Determining Employee Wishes: The Problem of Timing
Under the Code, certification depends on a showing that the union
represents a majority of employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining. Absent evidence casting doubt on the validity of the union's membership cards, the Board will usually certify, without a vote, any union with
a majority of the unit signed up as members. If the union has between thirtyfive and fifty percent membership, a representation vote will ordinarily be
held, 87 and the union will be certified if a majority of the employees who cast
their ballots vote in its favour. The Board has the discretion to order a vote
for a union with less than thirty-five percent membership, 8 but this discretion
is exercised only in unusual circumstances.
Timing is crucial for a union in a small-unit, high turnover industry. As
of what date must a union show majority support before it will be certified
without a vote? What will be the effect of changeover in personnel before
certification? If the union is not able to show majority support as of the
relevant date, who will be allowed to vote in any representation election? The
answers to these questions have differed materially throughout the bank organizing campaign, and, as the following discussion shows, the difference has
been of the utmost importance to union organizing campaigns.
Prior to June 1, 1978, and therefore at the time that the first bank cases
were heard, the Code provided that if, inter alia, the Board was "satisfied
that a majority of employees in the unit wish to have the trade union represent
them as their bargaining agent,"8 9 then the Board must certify the union. In
Swan River - The Pas Transfer Ltd.,90 the Board faced the question of the
relevant date for determining these employee wishes. In a judgment setting
out at persuasive length both the statutory and policy bases for its decision,
it concluded that the Code's goal of industrial peace would be best served by
using the date of application as the cut-off date. It reasoned as follows:
[M]any specialists in the field, we would venture to say the majority, claim that
industrial peace is bound to be disrupted for long periods of time if the Board has
to take into consideration events that take place between the date of the Application and any subsequent date.
Once it becomes known that after the deposit date the wish of the employees
as expressed by the serious commitment of signing a card, accepting to be bound
by a constitution and disbursing monies for union dues can be changed by a num86 C.P. Ltd., supra note 60, at 32 (di), 369 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 493-94 (C.L.L.C.).
87

Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, as am. by S.C. 1972 c. 18, s. 127(2).

88 Id., s. 127(1). This discretion was exercised to allow a vote in a number of bank

cases where the reason for the less than 35% membership figure was attrition due to
the passage of time.
89 Id., s. 126.
90 (1974), 4 di 10, [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 254, 74 C.L.L.C. 16,105.
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ber of circumstances and affect the decision of a Labour Board, one will invite a
chaotic labour relations situation.
For example:
1. one would be bound to allow the union to pursue an active campaign among
the employees in order to add to the list of members already filed in at the date
of the Application. This practice is not followed today when the application date
is the terminal date and to do so would make for disruption in the work force.
2. one would be inviting some employers to go in for outright campaigning
against the union aimed at persuading employees to change their minds. Also, one
would be tempting some employers to commit unfair labour practices to foster
resignations from the Union. This would in turn provoke the unions into active
counter-campaigning. All of which creates chaos. One may object here that there
are recourses under the law against employers who commit unfair labour practices. But this is of no assistance in the case of a sophisticated campaign where no
unfair labour practice is capable of being proven and yet is so very effective in
producing a change of mind or wish in the workers.
3. one would have to tolerate and deal with the intervention of a rival union
only too glad to try its luck with an afterthought application filed because of the
chaotic situation prevailing after the date of application.
4. one would have to study the roots of apparently legitimate or contrived substantial changes 91in the overall complement of employees in the unit after the
application date.

The best way to forestall all these evils, according to the Board, was to
formulate a rule according to which such activity woud be fruitless because it
would not affect the outcome of a certification application. If the date of

application were the relevant date for determining employee wishes, this
would be the case.
92
Unfortunately, the Federal Court of Canada did not agree. In CKOY,
a decision dated February 16, 1977, it rejected the Swan River interpretation

of section 126 and advanced the opinion that employee wishes should be
93
determined as of the date of certification. As a result of this decision the

Board was required to take cognizance of any expression of employee wishes,
and hence of any change in bargaining unit composition at least up to the
date of any hearing and possibly up to the date of actual certification as well.
The immediate administrative response of the Board was to enact

regulations requiring that unless evidence of employee wishes was filed within
94
ten days of application, the Board would not be required to consider it.
The initial applications of SORWUC and CUBE, however, fell between
two stools. At the time that they were filed, Swan River was the law. The
intervention of CKOY prevented the Board from disregarding evidence of
employee wishes submitted after the date of application, but the Board's new

regulation was passed subsequent to their filing. These applications, then, bore
the full brunt of CKOY.95 The union urged that the new regulations be given

91 Id. at 15-17 (di), 261-62 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 883-84 (C.L.L.C.).
92 Supra note 36.
93 Id. at 425 (F.C.), 240 (D.L.R.), 200 (C.L.L.C.).
94 S.O.R./77-237, [Hereinafter "CKOY regulation"].
95 The CKOY decision came down on February 16, 1977. The new Board regulations came into effect on March 14, 1977. Most of the applications dealt with in these
initial decisions were filed before either date.
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retroactive effect, but the Board refused,90 feeling compelled to consider evidence of employee wishes and unit changes right up to the date of the hearing.
As has already been pointed out, that involved an inordinate length of
time. There was a high rate of resignation from the unions, and normal turnover made significant inroads into these units. The result was that, although
the unions had enjoyed majority support in most of the branches involved on
the date of application, only nine certifications took place on SORWUC's
twenty-two applications. In some units support even fell below the thirtyfive percent required in normal circumstances to hold a vote. The union lost
in all cases, except one,97 where it was necessary to hold a vote.
This was a serious setback for the embryonic bank organizing campaign.
For applications filed subsequent to the new regulation, erosion of support
was effectively halted after ten days, no matter how long it took to deal with
the application. Serious problems remained, however, which even the regulation did not cure. Ten days is long enough for an employer to mount an
effective anti-union campaign. Furthermore, although the Board regulation
puts time limits on the expression of employee wishes, it took the position,
consistent with CKOY, that it could not free itself by regulation from its
obligation to look at changes in the composition of the bargaining unit after
the date of application. 98 Such changes may have resulted from resignations,
transfers, changes in complement or reorganization of the branch structure,
among other things. The Board's only response to the organizing problems
created by changes of this nature was to try to speed up the processing of
applications.9 9 This has not always been possible except in the most routine
cases.
Fortunately for the Board and the unions, the legislature came to the
rescue. One of the amendments to the Code in the June 1, 1978 package gave
the Board the power not only to consider the date of application as the cut-off
date for consideration of employee wishes, but also to set any other date that
it considered appropriate.1 0
In CanadianImperialBank of Commerce, Sioux Lookout Branch,10' the
Board discussed these new provisions at length. It outlined a number of
96 Victory Square, supra note 37, at 333 (di), 110 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 513 (C.L.L.C.).
97 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1977), 25 di 355 at 373-76, [1978] 1
Can. L.R.B.R. 132 at 146-48. [Hereinafter Victory Square #2.] The Board notes that
changes since the date of filing had reduced the union's membership in six out of eight
units to less than 35%.
98
See Bank of Montreal, Tweed and Northbrook Branch (1978), 26 di 591 at
600-601, [1978] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 123 at 130-31.
99 ld. at 601 (di), 130-31 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
100 The amendment reads:
[Where the Board] (c) is satisfied that, as of the date of the filing of the application, or of such other date as the Board considers appropriate, a majority of the
employees in the unit wish to have the trade union represent them as their bargaining agent, the Board shall, subject to this Part, certify the trade union making
the application as the bargaining agent for the bargaining unit.
S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 126(c) as am. by S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, s. 45, [Hereinafter the "CKOY
amendment"].
101 (1978), 33 di 432, [1979] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 18. [Hereinafter Sioux Lookout.]
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situations in which it might determine that a date later than the date of application was the relevant cut-off. Of these, only one is of immediate relevance
to the bank situation: where a representation vote must be ordered. 1 2 Its
implications will be discussed below. The Board then went on to discuss situations in which it will choose a date prior to the date of application.
The Sioux Lookout case itself involved an unfair labour practice complaint, as well as an application for certification. The union had signed up a
majority of employees in the unit on June 5, 1978 and increased its majority
the next day. It did not, however, apply for certification until June 8, 1978. In
the interim the following events took place: (1) on June 6th the manager
conducted a staff meeting, (2) on June 7th the General Manager and Personnel Manager for the Manitoba region conducted a staff meeting, (3) on June
7th an employee and union member who had given two weeks' notice of
resignation was replaced and let go with pay before her notice period was up,
(4) on June 7th a new consumer loans officer reported to the bank, and (5)
on June 8th a new bank officer in training reported to the branch. The local
manager had not been anticipating the arrival of these last two additions to
his complement. 03 Making the almost unprecedented finding that the bank's
Regional Personnel Manager had lied under oath,10 4 the Board determined
that these events were part of a strategy by the employer to "undermin[e] the
union's numerical support in the branch bargaining unit and [defeat] the freedom of employees' [sic] in Sioux Lookout 'to join the trade union of his
choice and to participate in its lawful activities' (section 110(1)). " 105

The Board then discussed remedies. The union would still have a
majority if the Board simply refused to consider the effect of transfers and
replacements, and this is in fact what it did, but it made the following pronouncement: "If required to we would exercise our discretion under section
126(c), in this case, and determine June 6th to be the appropriate date for
determining the wishes of the employees. On that date a majority of employees
in the unit were members of the union."' 6
This power to set earlier dates will be of great assistance in organizing.
As the Board points out in this decision, unfair labour practice provisions are
not adequate deterrents to employer attempts to influence employee free
choice prior to certification:
The obvious redress is the prohibited conduct provisions of sections 184 and 186
of the Code but success on complaints under these sections often provides only a
pyrrhic victory. An employer may be found to have violated the Code, but no
for determining employees' wishes the
certification is issued because at the 0 date
7
employer has achieved his objective.'

Several of the provincial labour statutes contain provisions allowing certification without proof of majority status when an employer's unfair labour
102
103
104

Id. at 434 (di), 20 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
Id. at 446 (di), 29 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
Id. at 449 (di), 31 (Can. L.R.B.R.).

'Or Id.
106 Id. at 449-50 (di), 32 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
107 Id. at 438 (di), 23 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
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practices have disrupted the situation to such an extent that a representation
vote will be unlikely to reflect the employees' true wishes.10 8 The Code provision does not go that far; the union must have had majority status at some
point, even if it was prior to application, before it can be certified pursuant to
this section.
In fact, the Code provision is potentially broader in some cases than
most of the provincial statutes. The Labour Relations Act of Ontario, for
example, limits the exercise of this extraordinary certification power to situations in which the employer has actually breached the Act.1 9 The CLRB,
on the other hand, is given complete discretion here and, although the Sioux
Lookout case itself did involve unfair labour practices, there is no indication
that this is a necessary trigger for the Board's discretion to set an earlier cutoff date. Employer conduct short of unfair labour practices, or even coercive
conduct by someone other than the employer, may be sufficient to create an
atmosphere in which the employees cannot freely express their wishes. In
such cases the CLRB could intervene and certify the union whereas the
Ontario Board could not.
There are still some problems caused by bargaining unit instability that
are not solved by the new amendments to the Code. One such problem arises
where it is necessary to conduct a representation vote. Some of the issues
raised by the problem of determining a voting constituency are discussed in
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Alness Branch.110 There the union's
position was that people who became members of the unit after the date of
application should not be able to vote.
The Board deals very casually and quite inadequately with this important
question. It states:
It is a well-recognized principle in labour relations that a certification order relates
to job functions and not to the individuals performing such functions. Accordingly, it is the employee performing the encompassed function at the time of the
vote, whether on a permanent or a part-time basis, that will be entitled to vote.", 1

Its conclusion does not, however, follow from its premises. A certification order
in a non-vote situation equally applies to job functions rather than persons,
yet in a non-vote situation the Board does not hesitate to disregard the wishes
of incumbents if they have changed between the time of application and
certification. If a different rule is to be applied for voting situations it must
rest on a more persuasive foundation; the Board offers none.

108 Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 24 as am. by S.N.S. 1977, c. 70, s.
1(9); The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 7 as am. by S.O. 1975, c. 76,
s. 5; Labour Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973 (2d Sess.), c. 122, s. 8(4)(e),
43(3).
109 S. 7(a) of The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232 as am. by S.O. 1975,
c. 76, s. 5. The Nova Scotia statute is also limited to unfair labour practice situations,
although the British Columbia Act is not (see section 43(3)).
110 (1978), 28 di 921, [1978] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 361, 78 C.L.L.C. 16,145. The issue
also arose as to whether women on maternity leave and their replacements could vote.
The Board decided that the former could vote but that the latter could not.
111 Id. at 930 (di), 368 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 538 (C.L.L.C.).
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The Alness case was decided prior to the 1978 amendments, but it is
probably still good law. In Sioux Lookout,1 2 a post-amendment case, the
Board indicated that it would use a date subsequent to the date of application
as the cut-off date for determining employee wishes in cases where votes are
held. In fact, the amendments do not address themselves to the criteria that
the Board should use in the exercise of its discretionary power to determine
who is eligible to vote. 11 3 Thus we are left with the anomaly that a union
with fifty-one percent support at the time of the application remains untouched
by changes in the bargaining unit prior to certification, while a union with fortynine percent can find that its support has completely evaporated, not because
its supporters have changed their minds, but because the unit has expanded.
Obviously, the few extra memberships can make a significant difference.
C.

Union OrganizingCampaign
The most widely publicized development in the bank organizing field
following the CLRB's June 10, 1977 decisions was the establishment, by the
Canadian Labour Congress in the fall of 1977, of the Bank Workers' Organizing Committee (BWOC). CLC unions had been conspicuously absent from
bank organizing until just before the unit decisions. Nation-wide publicity
surrounding those decisions as well as a request from SORWUC to the CLC
for financial assistance threw this inactivity into embarrassing relief. The
BWOC was the official CLC announcement that organized labour was finally
prepared to champion Canada's bank workers.
The BWOC itself is an umbrella organization consisting of representatives of the CLC's ten largest unions,"14 and was designed to co-ordinate
a nation-wide campaign to organize bank workers. It employs two different
modi operandi: organizing through affiliates and organizing through a special
bank workers' union. Affiliated unions with a strong presence in a particular
community are expected to organize bank workers in that community without
regard to CLC jurisdictional boundaries, using their own personnel and financial resources to do so. Once organized, it is contemplated that these units will
be given the opportunity to join the national bank workers' union. In March,
1978 ten CLC locals, collectively christened the Union of Bank Employees
(UBE), were chartered to organize bank workers in the ten different regions
of Canada. These locals are funded and serviced directly by the CLC. To
date, the United Steelworkers of America is the only union that has been
certified for bank units in accordance with the first branch of the plan.

Supra note 101.
Board is empowered by s. 128(1) (a) of the Canada Labour Code, S.C.
1972, c. 18, to "determine the employees that are eligible to vote" when a representation
vote is ordered.
114 The members of the BWOC are Canadian Union of Public Employees, United
Steelworkers of America, Service Employees International Union, Public Service Alliance
of Canada, Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, International Association of Machinists,
Canadian Paperworkers' Union, International Woodworkers of America and United
Autoworkers.
112

113The
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The BWOC was the scheme devised by the CLC to submerge jurisdictional difficulties in a united front to take on the banking industry, avoiding the friction that would inevitably result if the Congress were forced to
allot banking jurisdiction to one among a number of competing unions.
Unfortunately, the two CLC affiliates with the most colourable claims to
jurisdiction in the banking industry, the OPEIU and the Retail Clerks' International Union (RCIU), refused to go along with the co-ordinated effort
and struck out on their own. OPEIU, of course, already represented employees at the Montreal and District Savings Bank and was not prepared to
accept any rivals in what it considered to be its historic preserve. 10 It stepped
up organizing efforts in Quebec, and its OTEU local began organizing in
British Columbia as well, much to the chagrin of SORWUC. 110 RCIU, with
no real base in financial institutions in Canada, but with some history of bank
organizing in the United States,' 17 launched an expensive, well-staffed organizing campaign at about the same time that the BWOC was founded. 11 8
It has been operating largely in Ontario and Quebec. CNTU unions have also
been active in the banking industry since the unit decision.
Amidst this kaleidoscope of organizing activity, 1 9 what of SORWUC
and CUBE, the unions that started it all? CUBE, as noted earlier, had no
special commitment to bank workers. After negotiations with the CLC it was
absorbed without much difficulty by the BWOC. The history of the relationship between SORWUC and the CLC is considerably more complex.
SORWUC, although it diverged ideologically from established trade
unionism in many respects, had never taken a stand in principle against affiliation with the CLC. Nevertheless, by laying claim to a constituency consisting
broadly of unorganized women, SORWUC had raised CLC jurisdictional
hackles right from the very beginning. Thus, when SORWUC appealed to the
CLC for financial assistance in paying the enormous legal bills generated by
the landmark Victory Square decision, the CLC was unsympathetic; its
response was that CLC money was for CLC affiliates only. SORWUC countered by offering to recommend CLC affiliation to its members.1 20 The Con115 OPEIU has been the leader in U.S. bank organizing and holds the AFL-CIO
charter to organize banks: see Coleman and Rose, "Bank Unionization: Status and Prospects," White Collar Report, No. 967, October 17, 1975, at C-1.
116 SORWUC complained to the CLC about OTEU interference with its organizing,
but without success.
117 See Coleman and Rose, supra note 115, at C-1.
118 See "The Little Union That Couldn't," Macleans, September 4, 1978. RCIU claims
to have hired 22 bank workers as full-time organizers across the country, and to have a
budget of "some millions of dollars" for bank organizing. This compares very favourably
with the CLC's smaller staff and "million dollar war chest".
119 The unions involved in organizing U.S. banks are even more motley. Although
U.S. banks are scarcely more densely unionized than Canadian banks, certifications are
held by the Teamsters, UAW, ACTWU, Iron Workers, Communication Workers and
Steelworkers, to name just a few. See Coleman and Rose, supra note 115, Table I. The
Table shows 32 banks unionized, some dating back to the 1920's. Interestingly, one of them
is the Bank of Nova Scotia in Puerto Rico.
120 This history is documented by correspondence between the CLC and SORWUC,
reprinted in An Account to Settle, supra note 27, Appendix.
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gress, however, was not interested in SORWUC as an affiliate. It was
prepared to accept Local 2 of SORWUC, the United Bank Workers, on the
condition that it come in under the umbrella of the BWOC and put itself
under BWOC direction and control. Understandably, this proposition did not
appeal to a union firmly committed to the principles of autonomy for individual bargaining units and the solidarity of working women. SORWUC
continued without CLC affiliation.
The CLC viewed an affiliated SORWUC as an unmanageably disruptive
influence on an already tense jurisdictional situation. Its decision to reject
SORWUC's affiliation proposal is not entirely without rational basis. It may
have acted properly in conserving its own resources for affiliates, although this
is more doubtful. It did not stop there, however. It used its prestige to cut off
the donations of its affiliates to the struggling SORWUC. Throughout the bank
organizing campaign, SORWUC had been heavily dependent on funds
donated by other unions, many of them CLC affiliates.' 2' When it became
clear that SORWUC was not going to submit to the Congress's dictates, the
CLC took the steps that were open to it to ensure that affiliates' money did
not go to SORWUC. A circular was sent out from the head office advising
affiliates of the formation of the BWOC and appealing for the support of the
entire labour movement in a united front for this CLC endeavour. Affiliates
read between the lines and advised SORWUC that they were unable to make
further donations to the United Bank Workers. Even more directly, CLC representatives for the western region, presumably on instructions from Ottawa,
made explicit requests to affiliates not to give money to SORWUC. Not all
trade unions, particularly in British Columbia, submitted to the CLC interference and this did not entirely stop the flow of funds, but it certainly slowed
it down significantly. This CLC action was fatal to SORWUC and contributed
in no small part to its eventual paralysis at the bargaining table and withdrawal from active participation in bank organizing.
After the June 10, 1977 decisions, SORWUC continued to organize for
several months. In the balance of 1977 it made twenty-three more branch
applications, of which sixteen were successful. Two of these branches were
in Saskatchewan; all the rest were in British Columbia. In January, 1978, the
unions made a policy decision to switch from branch organizing to organizing
on a province-wide basis. After this, only one more branch application was
made. 22 For reasons discussed in detail below SORWUC withdrew from bargaining at twenty-four of its twenty-six units in the summer of 1978, and has
since withdrawn from the last two: the Saskatchewan units. Concluding from
its experiences that only larger units will be able to extract meaningful concessions from the banks, its current plan is to organize province-wide in
British Columbia.
121 Since SORWUC began organizing in the banks it has received a total of approximately $50,000 in donations from unions. CLC unions contributed $20,000,
$10,000 came from unions affiliated with the Canadian Confederation of Unions, and
$20,000 came from unaffiliated unions. SORWUC News, Summer 1978, at 14.
122 This was a successful application at a Commerce branch in Creston, British
Columbia, filed under pressure from the Creston employees despite the "no branch
application" policy.
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Despite the fact that so many unions have begun to show an interest 12in
8
the banking sector, the venture cannot, at least as yet, be called a success.
The number of certifications is insignificant compared to the number of bank
branches, and the rate of increase is very slow. There has been a significant
number of decertifications, not all of them in SORWUC units, and there are
more such applications before the Board. Many of the certified units have
not yet signed first contracts. Banking is still, for all practical purposes, unorganized. Why is this the case?
D.

Bank Counter-Campaign

CLRB Response to Bank Tactics
The banks, of course, have a large stake in keeping unions out of the
industry, and they have not been indifferent to the organizing efforts. Their
counter-campaign has taken a variety of forms ranging from the clearly legal
to the clearly illegal.
1.

Several of the employers' counter-tactics raise issues as to the permissible
range of "employer free speech" in representation campaigns. A very common practice with many, if not all, of the banks is for management to hold
what are known in labour relations parlance as "captive audience" meetings.
The legality of such meetings in the bank context has been considered, either
directly or indirectly, by the CLRB in a number of cases.
In Bank of Nova Scotia, Selkirk Branch,124 the union applied for certification with a majority. Between the time of the application and the hearing,
most of the employees withdrew from the union and the Board ordered a
representation vote. The union filed an unfair labour practice charge and
requested certification without a vote, alleging, inter alia, that two "captive
audience" meetings held with the employees during the organizing campaign
were improper.
Both of these meetings were conducted by senior management personnel
from the regional office. The first meeting was one of a series that regional
management had been conducting throughout the region to inform employees
of the terms and conditions of employment, including recently instituted
ombudsman procedures and a new dental plan. They did not deal directly
with the subject of unionization. The inference is clear, however, that both the
As of mid-March, 1980, the record stood as follows:
(1) SORWUC - 26 certifications, all revoked (24 in British Columbia, 2 in
Saskatchewan),
(2) CUBE - 3 certifications (Ontario),
(3) OTEU - 3 certifications (British Columbia),
(4) United Steelworkers of America - 3 certifications (1 each in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Quebec),
(5) RCIU - 28 certifications, 2 revoked (8 in Ontario, 17 in Quebec, 1 in Manitoba, 2 in British Columbia),
(6) UBE - 26 certifications (2 in British Columbia, 17 in Ontario, 4 in Nova
Scotia, 3 in New Brunswick),

123

(7) CNTU - 12 certifications (Quebec).
124

(1978), 27 di 690, [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 544. [Hereinafter Selkirk.]
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new benefits and the series of informational meetings were part of a deliberate
bank policy to persuade employees that they did not need a union. Furthermore, there was testimony from management itself that the timing of the visit
to this particular branch to coincide with the organizing campaign was not
accidental.125 The second meeting dealt specifically with union-related issues.
The Board encourages a policy of strict employer neutrality on representation issues. It is quite clear, however, that an employer may deviate
considerably from this ideal without entering the realm of illegality. In considering the effect of these two meetings on the certification proceedings, the
Board promises a posture of strict scrutiny of employer behaviour:
The scope of permissible employer communication to employees about employment relations matters and union affairs at the time of discussion among employees about exercising their right to be represented by a union is necessarily
limited. Words from an employer have an impact that is far more personal and
immediate than those from politicians or many others who affect an employee's
life. A threat or a promise, no matter how veiled, is quickly translated by an
employee into tangible consequences that can have a serious and readily perceived
cost to the employee. To minimize and discourage this trauma for employees and
promote an environment where employees can and do feel confident their right
section 184 and 186 places
under section 110 is real, the Board in administering
26
rigid limitations on employer communications.'

It then proceeded to spell out three areas in which the employer may communicate with employees during an organizational campaign: (1) to reply to
inaccurate propaganda, (2) to state facts on issues directly affecting him, and
27
(3) to publicize accurately existing terms and conditions of employment.'
These exceptions are capable of fairly broad interpretation and, not
surprisingly, the Board found the employer's conduct to fall within them,
although it does not specify which one. There is no analysis whatsoever of
the precise nature of the disputed discussions nor the effect of the "captive
audience" context.
The Board is not always so tolerant of "captive audience" speeches,
however. In Bank of Montreal, Tweed and Northbrook Branch,128 the situation was similar to that in the Selkirk case: the union applied for certification
with a majority only to have that majority evaporate before the hearing. The
union requested that the Board give no weight to employee changes in sentiment-a remedy that would have resulted in automatic certification. The basis
of the complaint was again two "captive audience" meetings, this time conducted by the manager of the branch, and a series of private meetings also
conducted by the manager. All these events took place after the application
for certification had been filed.
The subject of the first meeting was the union application. The employees
were not specifically discouraged from exercising their right to collective
bargaining, but the manager clearly conveyed the impression "that they would
Id. at 692 (di),
Id. at 698-99
127 Id. at 699 (di),
128 (1978), 26 di
125
128

546
(di),
551
591,

(Can. L.R.B.R.).
551 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
(Can. L.R.B.R.).
[1978] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 123. [Hereinafter Tweed.]
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receive adequate attention to their grievances on an individual basis and that
union representation would offer no more. 1 129 The second meeting was described as "a very emotional event": 30 the manager informed the employees
that their unionization was a "damaging and personal affront,"' 31 and that he
felt that he should ask for a transfer under the circumstances. 32 The private
meetings consisted of discussions of existing terms and conditions of employment, and the solicitation of individual grievances.
The Board was prepared to find "undue influence" in all of this and
hence a violation of the Code. The suggestion that the manager would seek
a transfer was characterized as a "definite implicit threat, or at least apprehension, of the unknown... ."3 Furthermore, it took a very dim view of the
manager's appeal to the loyalty of his employees:
In our current administration we must not restrict our appreciation of undue
influence to heavy handed tactics that entrepreneurs of small establishments employed in the social climate of earlier years. We must be sensitive to the readily
understood position of a manager in a modem corporate bureaucracy and the
authority he has, which in terms of employment conditions may be severely
restricted. He is assigned a difficult role, which the employees appreciate, and
seeks to engender personal loyalty to perform his responsibilities and the support
of his staff. If he deliberately or unthinkingly places that loyalty or the consequences of the employees' choice on his career as the price of employee exercise
of their freedom to be represented by a trade union, the interference with the
employees' freedom is synonymous with the entrepreneur's exercise of his economic authority." 4

The Board has not been consistent in its treatment of appeals to em-

ployee loyalty. In CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce, Gibsons Branch,"I
the manager met with the employees on learning that they had applied for
certification. Once again, the meeting was described as "very emotional," and
the manager spoke of applying for a transfer, indicating that he was personally affronted by the "terrible thing" that his "happy little working group-a
family" had done."36 Many of the employees, including the manager himself,
were in tears at the end of the meeting.
There was further evidence, however, that the manager had attempted
later in the same day to repair any damage that he might have done. He called
the employees together a second time, apologized for his behaviour, and
advised them that he was not attempting to influence them on the unionization
issue. Despite its strong language in Tweed, the Board could not find on the
basis of this sequence of events an attempt to influence the employees to withdraw from the union, nor even any evidence of anti-union sentiment.

129

Id. at 611 (di), 139 (Can. L.R.B.R.).

130

Id. at 609 (di), 137 (Can. L.R.B.R.).

131 Id. at 611 (di), 139 (Can. L.R.B.R.).

Id. at 609 (di), 137 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
133 Id. at 612 (di), 139 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
134 Id. at 612 (di), 140 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
135 Unreported decision, Board File: 745-293, [Hereinafter Gibsons #2].
136 Id. at 5.
132
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One thing is clear from the Board's handling of these cases: it is not
prepared to formulate any per se rules about "captive audience" meetings or
about the use of particular employer strategems. However desirable it may be
from a labour relations point of view for the Board to preserve its flexibility
in this area, this kind of approach poses problems.
One of these problems is analytical. The unfair labour practice provisions of the Code prohibit employers from intimidating or threatening
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Code. 137 In the past,
the Board quite properly refused to require a complainant in making his case
to prove that he was actually intimidated, or that the employer's threats had
the desired effect, considering it sufficient if the complainant proved that the
employer's actions tended to have the prohibited effect. This doctrinal position
has been somewhat obscured by the Board's free-wheeling approach to "employer free speech" issues in the bank cases. It is not easy to distinguish these
three cases on their facts. In Selkirk, the Board exonerated the employer's
conduct. It pointed to several highly suspicious circumstances surrounding the
meetings with the employees: "In other circumstances the environment of
the meeting (a captive audience situation), the status of the senior strangers
to the branch and the timing of the visits might very well lead us to assess that
the Code had been breached."'13 8 However, in the "overall circumstances"'13 9
(that useful piece of boilerplate) it was not prepared to find a breach here.
The crucial factor apparently was the lack of causal relationship between
employer conduct and employee withdrawals from the union.
Likewise in Gibsons #2, although the emotional appeal by the manager
to the employees' loyalty was even more blatant than in the Tweed case, that
appeal had no discernible effect at the time because no employees withdrew
from the union and the union was, in fact, certified. The Board comes very
close to basing its finding of "no breach" on the fact that no "complications"
arose. 140 In Tweed, where complications did occur, the Board found similar
conduct a violation of the Code.
In Selkirk, of course, the Board could quite properly have refused the
union the remedy that it sought-automatic certification-if the employer's
conduct were found not to have caused the situation of which the union complained. Nevertheless, the employer should not have been exonerated. Likewise, in Gibsons #2, the Board may well have felt that it was promoting good
labour relations by allowing the employer a locus poenitentia: if the manager
repented his improper conduct and no damage had been done, no useful
purpose would be served by awarding a remedy. Nevertheless, doctrinal consistency demands that the conduct be labelled unlawful even if no remedy is
awarded.
Aside from doctrinal consistency, however, the Board's approach is
open to the much more serious charge that it fails to provide direction to the
Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 184.
138 Selkirk, supra note 124, at 699 (di), 552 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
137

130 Id.
140 Supra note 135,

at 18.
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parties at a highly sensitive stage in their relationship. The Board may preach
employer neutrality but it is not likely to see it unless it can demonstrate
that brinksmanship does not pay. Clearly, such conduct does pay in this
game. To focus on just these three cases, the employer was successful with
highly emotional appeals to employee loyalty, "captive audience" meetings,
and strategically timed visits from regional office personnel, despite the fact
that the Board condemns all these practices. The odds are in favour of the
employer, and undoubtedly incidents like these will continue to occur until
the Board is prepared to formulate some per se rules or, at least, some stringent guidelines for employer participation in representation campaigns.
Labour boards have traditionally been cautious in the area of "employer
free speech," but they have been much stricter in their scrutiny of employer
conduct other than speech, and the CLRB has been no exception in dealing
with the bank cases. It has ruled unequivocally against two other employer
techniques for interfering with organizing activity: ( 1) manipulation of branch
complement, and (2) anti-union discharge.
The issue of unit manipulation emerges most blatantly in Sioux Lookout, discussed above. 141 In that case the union was able to prove that the
employer artificially swelled the unit after he became aware of the organizing
drive in order to defeat the union application for certification. The Board
remedy was simply not to count those employees who had been illegally
transferred into the unit in calculating the percentage of union membership.
Presumably, it would also have denied these people a place on the voters'
list if it had been necessary to call a vote.
Sioux Lookout, however, was an exceptional case. In an industry characterized by extremely high turnover, deliberate unit manipulation is difficult
to prove. In Sioux Lookout, the union case was made by the testimony of an
unusually candid branch manager. It was the conflict between his testimony
and that of the regional personnel manager that led the Board to the key
conclusion that the regional officer had perjured himself. Unions do not often
enjoy such luck; thus, unit manipulation will continue to be a problem, at
least to the extent that it is still relevant after the CKOY amendment to the
Code.
The banks have not often been so crude as to employ the time-honoured
technique of anti-union discharge, and the two cases in which the Board has
had to deal with the issue involve extremely complicated sets of facts. The
first case, Gibsons #2,142 discussed earlier in the context of "captive audience" meetings, involved the post-certification lay-off of the union's principal
organizer and spokesperson. The bank's evidence was that this layoff was for
strictly economic reasons. She was the junior teller.
Several months later, this scenario was repeated. Once again, the union's
chief spokesperson was the unlucky victim of a layoff. This time she was not
the junior teller.
141 S upra note 101.
142

Supra note 135.
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There was some reason to suspect the necessity of any layoffs at all.
The branch was a new one and the volume of business had not yet stabilized.
In fact, very shortly after the case was decided, to the embarrassment of the
Board, two new tellers were hired at Gibsons, suggesting at the very least
that these layoffs were premature, if not improperly motivated. Furthermore,
all banks follow a general policy of reducing their complements by attrition.
Layoffs are extremely rare-so rare so as to have raised immediate apprehension in the minds of the Gibsons employees that anti-union motivation
was involved.' 43 The union laid a complaint with respect to the second layoff.
The Board found no unfair labour practice. It must be remembered that,
under the Code at the time that the case was heard, the charging employee
had the burden of proof in all unfair labour practice cases. 44 In the face of
the employer's carefully documented evidence that the layoffs were economically necessary, the Board was not prepared to infer anti-union motivation.
Taking refuge behind the capacious phrase "exclusive managerial discretion,"' 45 it dismissed the complaint.
Nine months and a good deal of bank experience later one can see the
Board looking at bank evidence of business justification with a much more
jaundiced eye. In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto, 46 the
union issued a broad challenge to the employer's conduct in the face of organizing campaigns. More specifically, it challenged the
layoff of a teller and
147
the discharge of a loans clerk, both union activists.
The bank's justification for the layoff was the same as it had been in
Gibsons #2, economic necessity, and it was able to lead similar evidence to
bolster its position. The union, however, having learned the lesson of Gibsons #2, did not rely wholly on circumstantial evidence to buttress its case.
It was able to show a pattern of anti-union activity on the part of senior management that led overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the teller had been
laid off because of her union activity.
The case of the loans clerk was not quite as clear as that of the teller.
His involvement in union organizing was not as public as hers, and he was
discharged allegedly for incompetence. The evidence that his performance
was less than satisfactory was fairly conclusive. 148 Nevertheless, there was
evidence that the employer was aware of his union involvement, and the procedures surrounding his dismissal differed sufficiently from the norm to give
rise to the inference that his union activity was at least a "culminating inci143 Id. at 7.

144 The 1972 version of s. 188(3) of the Code failed to specify that the burden
of proof was on the employer although it did provide that the complaint would be
evidence of a breach of the Code.
145 Gibsons #2, supra note 135, at 21.
148 (1979), 34 di 677, [1979] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 391. [Hereinafter 199 Yonge Street.]
14 7 The unions also challenged the failure to hire a third person who was linked to
the union activists, but the evidence concerning her was very unsatisfactory and the
Board found no unfair labour practice in her case. Id. at 698 (di), 407 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
148 Id. at 694 (di), 404 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
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dent.'. 49 The Board was prepared to conclude in his case as well that the
employer had breached the Code.
The actions of regional and branch management in this case are worth
reviewing in detail for the insight that they give into bank strategies in the
face of union organizing. Several months before the union's first organizational meeting at the branch, two "captive audience" meetings were held by
the branch manager in which unionization was discussed, with specific focus
on a document discussed in more detail below. 1 0 Personal interviews with
each employee at 199 Yonge Street were conducted by three personnel officers from regional office in which both general employment and unionization matters were discussed. The teller's interview consisted of an attempt to
obtain her resignation. Other events included: a suspiciously-timed reduction
in the part-time branch complement; a devious procedure designed to secure
the teller's official resignation from her full-time position before laying her
off from her part-time position; a meeting attended by regional and branch
officers in which unionization at the branch was discussed and the probable
union sentiments of each employee at 199 Yonge Street were canvassed; a
second meeting attended by the same people during which individual files
of some of the branch employees were discussed; and a speech by the assistant manager at a regular staff meeting on the subject of unions, warning employees that they might be visited in their homes by union organizers and
advising them that they had a right to refuse admission to union organizers.
There is no evidence that this branch had any special status in the
Commerce organization. It is in the downtown commercial area of Toronto,
but it is by no means the largest or most important of the bank's branches
in that area. The obvious inference to draw from this record is that this kind
of attention is routine in branches considered to be "vulnerable."
After almost three years of bank organizing, a clear pattern of employer
anti-union activity is starting to emerge. Unions have been able to trace this
anti-union campaign at least as far up the hierarchy as regional office,16'
and its similarity across the country leads irresistably to the conclusion that
it is orchestrated by head office.' 52 The nature and intensity of the campaigns
vary from bank to bank, but some generalizations can be made.
All banks have hastened to improve wages and working conditions for
their non-unionized employees to an unprecedented extent. 16 3 They have also
Id. at 696 (di), 405-406 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
15 See text accompanying note 157, infra.
151 The deep involvement of the regional offices in 199 Yonge Street, supra note
146, Sioux Lookout, supra note 101, and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,
(1979), 34 di 651, [1979] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 266, 80 C.L.L.C. 16,001 [Hereinafter
Kamloops, to be discussed infra] is incontrovertible. All these cases involved the Bank
of Commerce.
152 The Board recognizes head office involvement in its most recent decision, Cana.
dian Imperial Bank of Commerce, unreported decision, Board Files: 745-422, 426 and
427 at 20. [Hereinafter CIBC.]
15 3 The banks in general introduced across-the-board wage increases of 5-6% in
1977 and 9% in 1978. The new Bank of Nova Scotia dental plan is noted in Selkirk,
supra note 124, at 691 (di), 545 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
149
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taken a much more "personal" interest in employee grievances." 4 Regional
offices are carefully monitoring pro-union sentiment and are attempting to
forestall problems that may lead employees to unionization. They are also
keeping sensitive fingers on the pulse of the organizing campaign; regional
forces are obviously ready to swing into action at the first alert to the appearance of a union organizer at any branch.
"Captive audience" meetings and personal interviews are commonplace
at this stage. The banks are also circulating an extensive document among
their employees containing, in question and answer format, selected information about unionization. A large segment is reproduced in the Sioux Lookout
decision; although it avoided labelling the distribution of the document an
unfair labour practice, the Board characterized it, at least in part, as "clearly
intending to point an employee away from trade unions."'1"5 Characteristic
of its tone is this exchange:
Q.-Is it true that a trade union could become certified with the support of only
18% of the employees in any given unit?
A.-Yes, this is possible. Where more than 35% but less than a majority of
employees sign trade union cards, the trade union may make application to be
certified. If a vote was ordered and only 35% of the employees bothered to vote
then 18% could constitute the majority required for certification. This is possible
not of
because the decision is based on the wishes of the majority of those voting
those in the unit, even though the whole unit would then be certified. 15 6
This is not untrue, of course, but it is calculated to engender an atmosphere
of panic and suggest to employees that, if they are not extremely vigilant,
they will have a union thrust down their throats.
Burden of Proof and Remedies
At least some of the employer tactics discussed above will be rendered
ineffective by the CKOY amendment to the Code providing that, in general,
the relevant date for determining employee wishes is the date of application. 15 7 Employer counter-campaigning after a certification application has
been filed with majority support will be futile in preventing certification.
Nevertheless, the issues raised by these cases are still extremely relevant. For
example, the manipulation of the complement can still affect an organizing
campaign where it is necessary to call a vote, as can any other coercive tactic.
Furthermore, the employer, in recognition of the fact that under the law now
in effect he must counter-campaign early or not at all, is intervening before
applications have been filed, before majorities have been signed, and in some
cases, even before organizing has begun in a particular branch. Unfair labour
practices committed at these earlier stages are much more difficult to prove
2.

154 Several banks have implemented ombudsmen or informal grievance procedures
for the first time. The Scotia Action plan is noted in Selkirk, supra note 124, at 691
(di), 545-46 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
155 Supra note 101, at 447 (di), 30 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
150 Id. This document receives adverse comment again in CIBC, supra note 152,
at 22.
157 See text accompanying notes 87-99, supra.
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and much more difficult to remedy. Therefore, the Board's approach to questions of proof and questions of remedy warrants examination.
The June 1, 1978 amendments brought the Code into line with most
other Canadian labour legislation in shifting the burden of proof to the
employer in cases where anti-union discharge, discipline or discrimination is
alleged. 158 Although there is no suggestion in the Gibsons #211 case that
the evidence was so finely balanced as to turn on burdens of proof, there is
no doubt that when the Union of Bank Employees brought similar facts
before the Board in the 199 Yonge Street case, 10 its task was made easier
by the intervention of the Code amendments. The shift in burden of proof
does not apply, however, to more generalized complaints such as those under
section 184(1).
The Board has generally required that a charging party prove an antiunion motive, although the prohibited motive need not be the only one or
even the predominant one. In a recent decision, however, it indicated a new
direction. 16' That case concerned the legal status of a management directive
to employees to cease wearing Canadian Labour Congress lapel pins to work.
The union had not yet applied for certification at the time that the complaint
was filed.
Although the Board found anti-union motivation in the management
directive involved here, it made, for the first time, the extremely significant
suggestion that anti-union motivation may not be an absolute requirement in
unfair labour practice cases.' 62 It outlined three possible classes of cases
under the Code: (1) those in which the Code specifically requires motive as
an element, (2) those in which the Code specifically prohibits certain effects
regardless of motive, and (3) those "that prohibit employer acts that interfere
with legitimate employee or union fights or collective bargaining interests without sufficient or legitimate, managerial, entrepreneurial or collective bargaining
justification."' 63 The last category would require the Board to balance the
with motive being the determinemployer-employee-union interests involved,
64
ing factor only where the balance is even.
The Kamloops decision gives no examples of this third category, and it
is unclear at this point how it will be used.'6 5 It may be that it will simply
158 CanadaLabour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 188(3) as am. by S.C. 1977-78, c. 27,
s. 67.
159 Supra note 135.
160 Supra note 146.
161 Kamloops, supra note 151.
6

21d. at 668-671 (di), 279-81 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 14,011-14,013 (C.L.L.C.).
16 3 1d. at 671 (di), 281 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 14,013 (C.L.L.C.).
164 This interest-balancing language suggests that the Board may be venturing into
paths already covered, with conspicuous lack of direction, by U.S. jurisprudence. For
1

an analysis of the confused court decisions in this area see Gorman, Labor Law (St.
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1976) at 336-38.

165 The discussion is confined to the issue of whether anti-union animus is required
for a violation of section 184(1) and the Board says nothing about whether it is necessary under section 184(3). Supra note 151, at 281 and 284.
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solve some of the union's evidentiary problems without making any dramatic
changes in the substantive law. Nevertheless, it is an important step in the
direction of imposing meaningful controls on employer conduct that interferes with employee organizing activity, since in theory at least it puts limits
on all employer conduct, no matter how it is motivated, that interferes with
employees' organizational rights to a significant extent.16°
Where the employer fires an employee for union activity, remedies are
fairly obvious: reinstatement and back pay go a long way toward compensating the employee for his injury. More complex remedial questions arise when
the employer's conduct has eroded the union's majority, prevented it from
acquiring a majority, or aborted a campaign entirely. The Board has evolved
fairly effective mechanisms for dealing with the eroded majority. Prior to the
CKOY decision, 167 the erosion of a majority between application and hearing could be ignored, since employee wishes were determined as of the date
of application. After the CKOY decision, but prior to the June 1, 1978
amendments, a majority lost between application and hearing could mean
dismissal or a vote. If, however, the Board found that withdrawals from the
union were induced by employer misconduct, it simply ignored them as involuntary and certified without a vote on the basis of the prior majority.1 8
After June 1, 1978 erosion of membership support between application and
hearing became largely irrelevant, but membership withdrawals before application could still thwart certification. To meet this situation, the Board has
evolved the still unused Sioux Lookout remedy: 169 if withdrawals are induced
by employer misconduct, it can set a date for determining employee sentiment prior to the date when the misconduct commenced and certify on the
basis of a majority as of that date.
Where the union never gets a majority because of employer misconduct,
the situation is much more difficult. The Code contains no provision for
certification without majority support in such cases. The general remedial
provisions of the Code are very broad indeed, but in light of the premium
placed on employee free choice and the elaborate procedures spelled out in
the Code dealing with numerical support for the union in the certification context, it is perhaps unlikely that the Board would certify a non-representative
union without specific statutory authority.
In at least one of the cases-199 Yonge Street-in which the union was
166 Since the time of writing the application of this new principle was dealt with
for the first time in Bank Canadian National (1979), 35 di 39, [1980] 1 Can. L.R.B.R.
470, in which the union filed a complaint under s. 184 alleging, inter alia, that the employer committed an unfair labour practice by refusing to implement a new cash deficit
policy in branches where applications for certification were outstanding. The majority
of the board found that this conduct was "inherently destructive of important employee
rights." (at 481). This test was adopted from NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Inc., 388
U.S. 26 at 33, 87 S. Ct. 1792 at 1797 (1967). Therefore, it was thought not necessary
to prove anti-union animus. The Vice-Chairman dissented.
167 See text accompanying notes 87-99, supra.
168 See, e.g., Tweed, supranote 128.
169 See text accompanying notes 100-08, supra.

214

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 18, No. 2

successful in proving unfair labour practices at a branch where it did not
have sufficient support for certification, the union sought broad and creative
remedies. It asked for an order against the employer to cease and desist
from interfering with the union's organizing campaign on a national scale
and, in particular, from holding "captive audience" meetings, interrogating
employees and disseminating anti-union literature in any of its branches. It
also sought a public apology, an access
order, organizational and exemplary
170
damages and a certification order.
With the possible exception of the certification order, these remedies
were all well within the jurisdiction of the Board to grant. Without examining
them in any detail, however, the Board concluded that the case did not involve violations widespread, serious or recurrent enough to warrant such
drastic remedies.' 7 ' Instead, it ordered the employer to furnish a copy of the
decision to each of the employees in the branch involved. The net result of
the decision was that, although the Board found that the employer's conduct
had successfully aborted the union's organizing campaign at 199 Yonge
Street, the only penalty that the employer sustained was the cost of photocopying and mailing the decision. The chances of the employees actually
reading and comprehending its forty-one legal-size pages are not great. This
is scarcely a deterrent! The remedy awarded in the Kamloops case was equally feeble: the employer was merely required to inform his employees at the
Kamloops branch that they were entitled to wear union pins, and why, and
to inform
management that it is unlawful to prohibit the wearing of union
172
pins.

The Board in both of these decisions was extremely solicitous of the
corporate amour propre of the Commerce. Despite clear evidence of regional
office involvement, the Board refused to find the existence of a corporate
policy of unlawfully combating the union in its branches across the country.
It did not wish to "humiliate" the Commerce by providing more global
173
remedies.
This attitude to remedies is dangerously shortsighted. If a concerted,
carefully orchestrated and skillfully managed anti-union campaign is in fact
being waged in the banks, as it clearly is, the chances are good that it will
be successful and that the employees' rights under the Code will be subverted. If the unfair labour practices by the Banks have to be litigated on a
branch-by-branch basis, and if branch remedies are as inefficacious as those
granted to date, there will be no deterrent as long as the banks start their
campaigns early enough.

E.

BargainingProblems
Up to this point banking conduct during organizing campaigns has been
considered, but it is a truism of labour relations that one of the best ways to
170 Supra note 146, at 704-705 (di), 412-13 (Can. L.R.B.R.).

1711d. at 705 (di), 413 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
172 Supra note 151, at 675 (di), 284 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 14,015 (C.L.L.C.).
.73 199 Yonge Street, supra note 146, at 705 (di), 413 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
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combat an organizing campaign is at the bargaining table. Bank conduct at
already certified branches has been an extremely significant factor in retarding organization. Many branch employees have taken a "wait-and-see" attitude to unionization; they want to see concrete results before they disturb the
status quo. Both union and management have been aware of this from the beginning and have conducted all their negotiations with more than an eye to
the effect that they will have on the wider organizing effort.
One of the more contentious preliminary issues was that of the bargaining format. As indicated earlier, SORWUC initially attempted to bargain for
its British Columbia units on a multi-branch, multi-bank basis. The banks,
despite the considerable benefits that they would have obtained by bargaining
on a joint basis, rejected this proposition out of hand; the union had been
certified on a single branch basis and would have to bargain on the same
basis. Manoeuvering over the bargaining format consumed valuable months
of negotiating time. SORWUC served its original notice to bargain on three
of the banks-the Commerce, the Bank of Montreal and the Bank of Nova
Scotia-on September 26, 1977. No concrete proposals were actually tabled
by the union until January, 1980.174
A second and even more contentious issue that arose early in the bargaining relationship was the question of the legal status of the banks' acrossthe-board compensation increases. The effect of unionization on routine
annual increases was an issue that had arisen very early in the organizing
campaign, and both sides were acutely aware of its propaganda value. Bank
spokesmen used the threat of a wage freeze for unionized employees in their
attempts to discourage employees from seeking union representation. Employees had expressed enough concern about this possibility to. prompt
SORWUC to issue a widely-distributed leaflet in mid-1977 advising employees that such a wage freeze would be unlawful.' 75 In late 1977, after a
number of branches had been certified, but before bargaining was really
under way, the Royal Bank and the Bank of Nova Scotia announced compensation increases for all of their non-unionized employees across Canada.
The Royal offered to implement the same increase in the unionized branches
if the union would agree to accept them as the total compensation increase
under any collective agreement subsequently to be negotiated.76 The union
turned this down, although it offered its consent without prejudice to any
further wage increases in the branches that it represented. In the Bank of
Nova Scotia, the wage increases were simply implemented in the nonunionized branches and withheld in the unionized ones without any notification to the union.' 7 7 SORWUC filed unfair labour practice charges under
sections 184 (1 ) (a), 3 (a) and 3 (e) of the Code against both banks.178
174 This history is outlined in Royal Bank, Kamloops and Gibsons Branch (1978),

27 di 701, [1978] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 159, 78 C.L.L.C. 16,132. [Hereinafter Gibsons #3.]
175 Id. at 705-706 (di), 163-64 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 440 (C.L.L.C.).
176 Id. at 703 (di), 161 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 438 (C.L.L.C.).
177 See Bank of Nova Scotia, Vancouver Heights Branch (1978) 28 di 901 at 902,
[1978] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 181 at 182. [Hereinafter Vancouver Heights.] Others of the
"Big Five" also took this action.
178 Id. at 904 (di), 183-84 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
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These cases raise fundamental questions about the nature of the Canadian industrial relations system and the role of the law in regulating collective
bargaining. The principle that lies behind much of the design of the collective
bargaining system is that certification of a union equalizes bargaining power
between employer and employees: individually employees are no match for
an employer until they fully support their union. 79 This, of course, is nothing
more than a pious hope. There is nothing in the nature of collective action
that guarantees this result. The most that can be said about the fact of
certification is that employees are stronger together than they are alone. They
may still be weaker than the employer. Nevertheless, the myth of equality
remains at the foundation of the system. As the policy-makers see it, there
are winners and losers in specific situations, but, over the long run, the substantive fairness of the wage bargain is guaranteed by this balance of power.
Therefore, the Labour Relations Board, in enforcing the law, is reluctant
to intervene in the bargaining process:
The Board is not an instrument for resolving bargaining impasses. Proceedings
before the Board are not a substitute for free collective bargaining and its concomitant aspect of economic struggle. Therefore, the Board should not judge the
reasonableness of bargaining positions, unless they are clearly illegal, contrary to
public policy, or an indicia, among others, of bad faith. Because collective bargaining is a give and take determined by threatened or exercised power, the Board
must be careful not to interfere in the balance of power and not to restrict the
exercise of power by the imposition of rules designed to require the parties to act
gentlemanly or in a genteel fashion. 180

Only the most blinkered formalist could fall into the error of believing
that certification made SORWUC the equal in economic clout of the Royal
Bank or the Bank of Nova Scotia. Clearly these banks, with thousands of
branches, hundreds of thousands of non-unionized employees and billions of
dollars' worth of assets behind them, held the overwhelming edge. Yet, it is
from the perspective of a need to preserve a balance of power, presumptively
created by the magic wand of certification, that the Board initially approaches the problem posed by the wage freeze.
The Code at the time these cases were heard contained section 148 (b),181
which froze the terms and conditions of employment after notice to bargain
has been given.' 8 2 From the union perspective, since annual salary reviews

179 See, for example, the preamble to the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
61 Stat. 137, [Hereinafter Taft-Hartley]:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to
the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees. [Emphasis added.]
180 CKLW Radio Broadcasting Ltd. (1977), 23 di 51 at 58-59, 77 C.L.L.C. 16,110
at 696.
181 CanadaLabour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1 as am. by S.C. 1p77-78, c. 27, s. 51.
182 It is necessary to obtain Ministerial consent before charging a violation of this
section. Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 187(5).
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were the norm in the banks, annual increases should be seen as one of the
established conditions of employment which the employer could not alter
after notice to bargain was given. It is arguable that the case was one that
fell within section 148. The union charge was not, however, filed under that
section. It was, as has already been indicated, filed under the general unfair
labour practice provision, section 184. This legal strategy was partly dictated
by technical requirements. With respect to some of the unionized branches,
the increases had been withheld before any notice to bargain had been given.
Furthermore, one of the employers' actions complained of was an increase in
vacation benefits granted by the Bank of Nova Scotia. There was no pattern
of improvement in vacation benefits and therefore no basis for arguing that
withholding a generally-granted improvement was an alteration in terms
and conditions of employment.
The union's decision to complain under section 184 rather than under
section 148 was not simply a result of these fairly insignificant wrinkles in
the fact situation: it had much broader implications. Section 148 focuses on
the bargaining relationship between two parties, prohibiting certain specific
conduct on a strict liability basis. The union's complaint, however, was that
the banks' action, whether or not it fell within the limitations of the wage
freeze provision, was an unfair labour practice because it was discriminatory
and punitive against unionized employees. Even more significant, the complaint was that by singling out unionized employees in this way, the banks
were discouraging their non-unionized employees from unionizing. Thus, the
union was charging both bargaining and organizing violations.
The Board, however, was unable to see beyond section 148. Despite
the fact that the procedural and substantive preconditions for section 148 had
not been met, it devoted extensive discussion to the operation of that section.
In fact, its decision can be summarized as follows: if this case had been
governed by section 148, there would have been no breach of that section
and therefore there can be no breach of the Code. Such elliptical reasoning
invites careful examination.
There are two competing theories as to the meaning of wage freeze
provisions like section 148. The first is the one adopted by other labour
boards in Canada with similar statutory provisions. 8 3 In their view, "terms
and conditions of employment" is a dynamic rather than a static concept; if
annual increases, merit reviews or bonuses are the norm prior to a statutory
freeze, then the employer must continue to implement them until the freeze
is lifted. The second theory is that the freeze is static. If employees are making five dollars an hour when the freeze takes effect, they continue to work
at that rate until it is over, even if the rate was due to be increased to six
183 See e.g., Spar Aerospace Products, [1978] O.L.R.B. Rep. 859, [1979] 1 Can.
L.R.B.R. 61, 78 C.L.L.C. 16,169 [hereinafter Spar Aerospace]; Kiddies Togs Mfg. v.
R. ex rel Deuitch, [1964] Que. S.C. 444, 3 C.L.L.C. 14,040; Hospital Employees'
Union, Loc. 180 v. Cranbrook and Dist. Hospital Soc. (1968), 68 C.L.L.C. 14,145
(B.C.S.C.); see also, NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, 434 F. 2d 93 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S.Ct. 1107 (1962).
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dollars an hour the next day. This view, although it has virtually no authoritative support in this country, 184 is the one espoused by the CLRB:
[S]ection 148(b) and its language is not to be interpreted by reference to contracts
of employment or customs in effect prior to notice to bargain. By choosing union
representation employees decide that they want to participate in the process of
determining their conditions of employment. They participate by their union bargaining with the employer. The basis for bargaining is the situation obtaining
when notice to bargain is given. 18 5

The CLRB finds that section 148 is intended to protect the union's exclusive
right to bargain. To allow annual increases and merit increases, reasons the
Board, is to allow individual bargaining.
This is surely too narrow a conception of the purpose of the freeze
provision. It certainly functions to protect the union's status as bargaining
agent, but it is redundant for that purpose, since the union's exclusive bargaining authority flows from its certification and not from its notice to bargain.
It is an unfair labour practice to attempt to bargain with individual employees after a union has been certified, regardless of whether a notice to
bargain has been given.
The most important function of section 148 (b), and one that the Board
ignores, is to protect the union's bargaining position by protecting the employees from being worse off under a collective bargaining regime than they
were when they were unrepresented. If the status quo ante that is preserved
leaves the employees in a worse position than before, which is the case if
those terms of their individual contracts of employment providing for increases and bonuses are simply expunged, then the union's bargaining position is undermined right from the start.
In the bank cases under discussion, the withholding of the wage increase
had precisely that effect. Instead of bargaining from a position in which the
unionized and non-unionized employees were paid the same rates, the union
was being asked to bargain from a position in which the unionized employees
made less than the non-unionized employees. The floor for collective bargaining had suddenly been lowered. As the Ontario Board says, this cannot fail to
have a "chilling effect ...upon the representation of the employees by a
6

trade union.'

8

The approach adopted by the Ontario and other boards is not without

its own difficulties. Pinning the status quo on the individual contract of employment, a legal fiction at best and a mockery of the very notion of contract
at worst, has the potential to undermine the entire concept of a freeze. It is
difficult to maintain that such a contract does not imply great latitude for the
84

The CLRB in Gibsons #3, supra note 174, at 175, cites only R. v. Canadian
General Electric, [1961] O.W.N. 117 (Co. Ct.), long since rejected by the Ontario
Board, and two unreported decisions of the British Columbia Supreme Court (Uniroyal,
1966; and University of British Columbia, 1965) as authority for its position.
185 Gibsons #3, supra note 174, at 722 (di), 176 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 449 (C.L.L.C.).
180 Spar Aerospace, supra note 183, at 868 (O.L.R.B. Rep.), 68 (Can. L.R.B.R.),
713 (C.L.L.C.).
'
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very kind of unilateral employer action that section 148 and its ilk are designed to prevent. The dynamic concept of "terms and conditions of employment" has been used to uphold layoffs'8 7 and changes in hours of work
during the statutory freeze, s8 as well as wage and benefit increases opposed
by the negotiating union. 8 9
Nevertheless, on balance, the dynamic concept is the preferable one.
The CLRB interpretation, which protects only the right of the union to bargain, is a hard-line approach which completely fails to take account of the
real inequalities in bargaining power. The Ontario interpretation, in providing some additional protection to the union's bargaining position, at least
confronts the existence of such inequalities.
As for the real issue before it-whether or not there was a section 184
violation-the Board gave only the briefest consideration to the possibility.
It finds that the employer, having complied with section 148, "acted properly
and within its rights ...

."1

This is surely a dubious starting point. The

Board was prepared to take a cursory look at the posibility that the mode
of communication of the wage freeze might give rise to an inference of antiunion animus,191 but, not surprisingly, given its basic premise, it swiftly
rejected it.
The impact of this decision was devastating. It is not over-dramatic to
say that it struck the death-blow to SORWUC's organizing drive. SORWUC
reports that its membership statistics showed immediate and catastrophic
decline when the wage freeze was announced, followed by a decline equally
92
catastrophic when the CLRB decisions in these cases were announced.1
Organizing by other unions as well lost what little momentum it had. Bank
workers obviously felt that a wage increase in hand was worth more than
the possibly nugatory improvements that unionization promised. In view of
the progress of the negotiations to that point, that choice was a very rational
one, if it had to be made.
Bank unions felt strongly enough about the issue to take the unusual
step of raising it squarely before the CLRB again within the same year, when
the "freeze" tactic was used again-this time with respect to a nine percent
increase for 1979-and this time, in an unprecedented volte face, the Board
saw things the union's way. The Board postponed the decision on the union's
complaint from April 11, 1979 to November 30, 1979, but, when the deciCanadian General Electric, [1965-66] O.L.R.B. Rep. 649.
188 Parr'sPrint and Litho Ltd., [1973] O.L.R.B. Rep. 597.
189 Scarborough Centenary Hospital, [1969] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1049.
90Gibsons #3, supra note 174, at 723 (di), 177 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 450 (C.L.L.C.).
101 Memoranda circulated to non-unionized branches by the Bank of Nova Scotia
announcing the improved wages and benefits contained the clear message that the improvements were not being granted to unionized employees. Vancouver Heights, supra
note 177, at 903 (di), 182 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
182 SORWUC reports a high of about 430 members when the freeze was announced.
This dropped to about 250 between the announcement of the freeze and the Board
decision that the freeze was lawful, then dropped again to about 150 before SORWUC
withdrew from negotiations. See An Account to Settle, supra note 27, at 107.
187
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sion finally came down, 19 3 it found the Commerce0 4 guilty of an unfair
labour practice in withholding the increase from its unionized employees.
This is unquestionably the correct result, but its impact is reduced somewhat by the fact that the Board reached this result by a route that throws the
whole area into some confusion. It virtually ignored its earlier decisions.
There was certainly some basis for an early re-examination of the area. The
recent Code amendments had reversed the burden of proof in section 184(3)
complaints, and a new "freeze" provision had been introduced (section 124)
prohibiting changes in terms and conditions of employment in the postapplication, pre-bargaining period, 195 but neither of these amendments directly addressed the policy analysis on which the earlier decision was based-an
analysis that the Board totally disregarded.
Furthermore, the principal basis for the finding of the unfair labour
practice was not the "freeze" itself, but the method by which the Commerce
chose to communicate the freeze to its employees. The Bank circulated a
memo to all employees announcing the increase and pointing out that it
applied only to non-unionized branches. Employees at unionized branches
were required to initial the memo to ensure that they had seen it. The Board
described this procedure as an attempt to intimidate both unionized and nonunionized employees-an attempt that was intended to have, and did have,
a chilling effect on union organization. 196 The Board found this to be in
breach of section 184(3).
The Board then considered whether or not the employer's conduct also
breached section 124. This new section was applicable to only one of the
bank branches under consideration, since it applies only to a particular time
frame and the others were at a different stage of their relationship at the time
that the complaint was made. The Board found the employer's conduct to be
in violation of this section as well. It clearly adopted the "dynamic" view of
the freeze which it rejected in the earlier case: "Basically, it is 'business as
before'. Here, business
as before was the granting of the nine percent general
197
salary increase.'
By implication, this overrules the earlier decision, but the Board did not
clearly say so. In fact, it deliberately refrained from considering the effect
of section 148, the198post-notice-to-bargain "freeze" provision discussed in
the earlier decision.
As a result, absent a mode of communication that is, in itself, an unfair
193 CIBC, supra note 152.

194 Complaints were also filed against the Royal Bank and the Bank of Montreal.
The Board heard the Commerce complaint first, with the other two banks agreeing to
be bound by the decision insofar as it was applicable to their conduct.
195 Section 124 actually applies from the time the application for certification is
made until the application is withdrawn or dismissed, or, if the union is certified, until
thirty days after the certificate is issued. Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1977-78 c. 18, s. 44.
196 CIBC,supra note 152, at 23.
197 Id. at 34.
198 Id. at 39.
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labour practice, the case is a precedent only for "freezes" that are implemented after application for certification and before notice to bargain is
given. A "freeze" at any other time may be just as devastating to union organization, no matter how it is communicated, but it is still an open question
whether it would be unlawful. Because the Board failed to clarify its position
on section 148, the question may have to be re-litigated still further. 99
The banks have a legitimate grievance against the Board as well. The
Board gave its blessing to their 1978 wage freeze and they conducted themselves accordingly for 1979. In this latest decision, the Board not only betrayed this reliance, but also added insult to injury by awarding the amount
of the 1978 increase as well as the 1979 increase to unionized employees
in order to bring their wages fully into line with those of the non-unionized
200
employees.
The decision is, however, of enormous significance at least to this extent: the Board was finally prepared to recognize, at least on the part of the
Commerce, a concerted corporate anti-union policy: "It has become apparent
throughout the organizational attempts at various branches of the employer
across the country, by several unions, that this employer has embarked on a
campaign designed to discourage its employees from exercising their rights
under the Code." 20 1 From this altered perspective, it should be more sensitive
to union unfair labour practice charges and perhaps more creative in fashioning remedies.
F.

Results of Bargaining
Although the total number of current branch certifications now stands at
seventy-three,20 2 the process of bargaining has been very slow, and many of
these units have not yet signed first contracts. In October, 1978, CUBE
members ratified the first collective agreements negotiated with the chartered
banks. These contracts are unremarkable. They contained Rand-formula
union security clauses, but, in terms of wages and benefits, unionized employees got no more than had been given to all non-unionized employees
earlier in the year.20 3 Other unions have found the banks equally unwilling
to agree to substantial concessions in collective bargaining; all the contracts
that have been signed provide for wage increases similar to those already
given to non-unionized employees.
199 Since the time of writing, the Board has indeed clarified its position, although
the clarification can scarcely be said to contribute to the intellectual consistency of the
Board's handling of "freeze" problems. In Bank of British Columbia (unreported decision, Board File: 556-7) the Board makes the entirely unexpected announcement that
it does indeed intend to apply different "freeze" concepts depending on whether the
"post application freeze" (s. 124), or the "post notice-to-bargain freeze" (s. 148) is
involved. With respect to s. 148, the Board continues to adhere to the "static freeze"
concept outlined in earlier decisions, while with respect to s. 124, the "dynamic freeze"
concept will continue to apply. In taking this position, the Canada Labour Relations
Board is unique in North America.
200
Id. at 38.
201 Id. at 19.
202 See note 124.
203 The CUBE negotiations are discussed in Ontario Labour, supra note 24, at 8-9.
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The reasons for the banks' tough bargaining stance seem clear. The
unions want contracts that they can use as bargaining tools. They need to
show other bank workers that they can make gains through collective bargaining that can be achieved in no other way. The banks, on the other hand,
want to convey the message to their employees that they will gain nothing
by unionizing. Very early on they made it clear that any gains achieved 20by4
unionized branches would be extended to non-unionized branches as well.
As the contracts show, the banks have the bargaining power.
Most unions signed contracts, despite the unfavourable terms. An alternative response to the inequality of bargaining power is to be found in the
bargaining history of SORWUC which, like every other activity of that union,
warrants consideration in particular detail. SORWUC, as discussed earlier,
initially attempted to bargain a master contract for its British Columbia units.
The banks refused. This battle over bargaining format was one that only the
banks could win. Legally, they were on unimpeachable ground in insisting on
their right to bargain only for individual bargaining units, but this bank
position was an assault on SORWUC at its most vulnerable point. It simply
did not have the financial resources or staff to bargain for twenty-six individual branches and still keep on organizing.
While this manoeuvering over format was going on, the banks initiated
their nation-wide compensation increase for non-unionized employees. In
such an atmosphere, collective bargaining did not flourish and negotiations
continued to drag on. 20 5 SORWUC took successful strike votes at three of its
Commerce branches, and observers of bank organizing waited for the next
crisis.
It came, but not in the form of a strike. In the first week of August,
1978, SORWUC informed the country that it was withdrawing from bank
negotiations. Shortly thereafter, the union requested that the CLRB cancel
its certifications for twenty-four 2out
of its twenty-six units, a move unparalleled in Canadian labour history. 0 6
SORWUC offered the following justification for its conduct. Its only
weapon in the fight to secure a creditable contract was the strike, but it had
grave reservations about attempting to strike. To use the Commerce example,
SORWUC had certifications for a total of six out of 1,824 Commerce
branches across the country. Turnover had taken its toll, and at only three
of these-the three at which the strike vote had been taken-did the union
still have majority support. It was unlikely that a strike alone would shut
down even the struck branches, let alone put the national institution to any
24 See Burns-Fry Study, supra note 17, at 3.
205 Another obstacle to bargaining was the fact that the banks had appealed many
of the Board's decisions to the Federal Court and had asked the Board to review others.
Although they did not refuse to bargain, they took the position that the whole issue of
bank unionization was still up in the air.
206 As a procedural matter, these units were not decertified under s. 137 of the
Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1, since many of them had not been certified for the requisite year; instead the certifications were rescinded under s. 119 of the
Code, the Board's general power to review and rescind any decision.
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serious inconvenience. Any strike strategy had always revolved around a
province-wide boycott tactic. With both financial and moral support from
CLC unions dwindling as a result of the head office conduct,2 07 the prospect
of a successful boycott was remote. Furthermore, the union doubted its
ability, given its small staff, membership and financial resources, to counter a
strong anti-strike, anti-boycott campaign. It particularly feared the reactions
of non-unionized bank workers who might be put out of work by a successful
boycott. Finally, the union was in very serious financial difficulty and simply
could not continue to bargain on the banks' terms. Negotiations had been
effectively stalled since it became evident that the banks were firm in refusing
to offer more for 1978 than they had already given their non-unionized employees. SORWUC, for both ideological and practical reasons, was unwilling
to sign the kind of contract that CUBE and the other unions eventually
signed.
The dilemma is a real one for trade unionists. A poor first contract can
be almost as great a defeat as no contract, especially when organization
has not penetrated very far into the sector. The paradox is that, in order to
gain support for the union, it is necessary to show results; a first contract is
an organizing tool in a situation like this. In order to get results, however,
it is necessary to have bargaining power, which is very difficult to muster in
a thinly unionized sector.
SORWUC's action was greeted with consternation by trade unionists
across the country. The union was accused of abandoning its bank workers.
The ultimate wisdom of SORWUC's decision must, however, be assessed
against the future course of bank organizing in Canada, and the returns are
not yet in. SORWUC itself is down but not out. It has now withdrawn from
all its certified units, including the two in Saskatchewan, but, as discussed
earlier, it contemplates resuming organizing at some future date on some
basis other than branch-by-branch. The response of bank workers at that
time will be the best indicator of whether SORWUC's withdrawal should be
seen as a betrayal or as a strategic retreat.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study is to examine the role played by the law in
organizing and collective bargaining in a sector of the economy that has historically been unorganized. Does the law promote unionization and collective
bargaining in such a sector? If it does not, or does not do so adequately,
to
20 8
what extent can it be made a more effective instrument for that purpose?
Labour relations legislation in Canada was not originally conceived to
play a promotional role in the spread of trade unionism and collective bargaining. The statute that set the pattern for modern trade union legislation
in Canada was the federal The Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigatext accompanying notes 119-23, supra.
The assumption here is that collective bargaining is a practice worth promoting.
See Canadian Industrial Relations: Report of Task Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa,
1968). [Hereinafter Woods Report.]
207 See
20 8
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tion Act 209 of 1948, a marriage between the American National Labor Relations Act,210 and earlier Canadian legislation creating dispute settlement
mechanisms for industrial unrest.2 11 There is still a great deal of debate about
the primary purposes of the Wagner Act. The "New Deal" political climate
out of which it arose was one in which social-democratic reformers allied
with doctrinaire laissez-faire capitalists to save America from political and
economic collapse. This bastard origin suggests mixed motives: reduction in
industrial warfare with its deleterious effects on productivity, equalization of
bargaining power, and promotion of collective decision-making and "industrial democracy."2 12 The Wagner Act, potentially at least, serves all these
goals, and it is difficult, and perhaps not particularly fruitful, to identify
which was the most important in the eyes of its architects. The Canadian
legislation, however, differed considerably from the Wagner Act. To highlight just a few of the significant differences, The Industrial Relations and
Disputes Investigation Act provided for complicated procedures for conciliation and postponement of strikes during or after negotiations for a collective
agreement, outlawed strikes at any other time, and mandated grievance settlement procedures.213 These differences suggest that Canadian policy-makers
had their
eyes on one goal above all others: the promotion of industrial
2 14
peace.
To promote industrial peace, it is not necessary to promote collective
bargaining as a positive good for all workers. It is necessary only to legitimize
it, and mandate it as a safety valve for such industrial unrest as was spontaneously generated by social and economic forces. Thus, those workers who
"chose" to organize could bring that fait accompli before a passive state
agency which would bless their efforts and send them forth to battle. Only
now their battle would have to be fought with a much more restricted set of
weapons than before. The law was certainly never designed or intended to
evangelize collective bargaining or to generate conflict where workers were
quiescent under the regime of unilateral employer action. That role belonged
to the labour movement. The state defined its own role as neutral arbiter of
the class struggle.

209 S.C. 1948, c. 54. This act was modelled very closely on Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, Can. War Orders and Regs., P.C. 1003, which, by virtue of the federal
emergency power, applied throughout the country.
210 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, c. 372, 61 Stat. 135 (1935). [Hereinafter
Wagner Act.]
2 11
The history of these legislative developments is outlined in Woods, Labour
Policy in Canada (2d ed. New York, MacMillan, 1973) especially chapters II and III.
212 The purposes behind the Wagner Act are discussed in Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 19371941" (1978), 62 Minn. L.R. 265 at 281-5.
213 The IndustrialRelations and Disputes Investigation Act, S.C. 1948, c. 54, ss. 16,
17, 19, 21-38.
214 Cf. Woods, "The Course of Labour Policy in Canada" in The Direction of
LabourPolicy in Canada,ed. Bairstow (Montreal: McGill University, 1977) at 5, where
the author discerns "the old Canadian preoccupation with industrial peace" in these
provisions.
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The trade union movement thrived within this format for a number of
years. From a pre-war low of fifteen percent, union membership climbed to
about twenty-five percent of the non-agricultural work force in 1946 under
the influence of the war-time regulations similar to the 1948 Act, and
by 1952 it was thirty percent, by which time legislation on the federal model
had spread to most of the provinces. There, however, it levelled off. The
figure hovered around thirty percent for twenty years, and it even dropped
back to twenty-six percent in the early 1960's.215
By the mid-1960's it was clear that a new approach was needed to make
collective bargaining more accessible to the vast numbers of unorganized
workers. The Woods' Task Force, established by the federal government to
examine labour policy, identified the limited coverage of trade unionism and
collective bargaining as an area of concern, 210 and recommended a more
positive legislative stance which would open the system to more of the unorganized. 217 This new policy is reflected in the 1972 amendments to Part V
of the Code. - 18 Organization rights were extended to certain groups of employees who had hitherto been excluded from coverage under the Code. 219
A preamble was enacted containing a positive commitment to the values of
collective bargaining. 20
This commitment to promoting and encouraging collective bargaining
as the desirable method of establishing terms and conditions of employment
and settling disputes is potentially revolutionary in its implications. Unfortunately, it is engrafted onto a statute that basically maintains the old "state
as neutral arbiter" approach to labour relations. The labour board retains its
passive role, waiting to be approached by employees who have "chosen"
unionization. Admittedly more employees are now allowed to make that
choice within the scope of the Code, but there are few provisions to attract
those millions of workers who could always. have made the choice but who
failed to do so.2 ' The preamble commits Canada to the promotion of collective bargaining, but the Code provides no readily apparent mechanisms for
carrying out the task in those sectors of the economy that, historically, have
been unorganized.
The historic inability of the trade union movement to penetrate sectors
like finance, insurance and retail trade suggests that there are special problems facing unions in these sectors. On the basis of this study, it is possible to
generalize usefully only about the financial sector, and in particular the

215 See Labour Organizations in Canada, 1976-1977, Table 1, supra note 1 and
Labour Organizationsin Canada, 1978, Table 1, supra note 1.
216 Woods Report, supra note 208, at 85-90.
2

17 Id. at 138-40.
218 S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1.

210 In particular, "dependent contractors" was included in the definition of "employee" in s. 107(1) of the Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1.
22

o Supra note 55.

One exception to this is the reduction in the membership percentage needed by
a union in order to get a vote from 50% to 35%.
221

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 18, No. 2

chartered banks. Yet many of the same conditions prevail in insurance and
retail trade; it is suggested that the problems are similar in all three sectors.
The chartered banks of Canada are an oligopoly. The industry is highly
regulated, entry is difficult, and although the rise of "near-banks" in recent
years has put some competitive pressure on the chartered banks as a group,
there is little scope for substantial inter-bank competition. Both the regulation and the oligopolistic conditions have resulted in inter- and intra-bank
working conditions that are very close to uniform.
The fact that bank work is generally done through small, relatively selfcontained units has two consequences for labour relations. First of all, the
small size usually promotes close working and personal relationships with
supervisors and management-a traditionally inhibiting factor in unionization.2 Second, the large number of units makes initial organizing costs
astronomical for unions, and prevents economies of scale in administering
collective agreements. This means that unions on tight budgets will think
twice about entering the banking sector, since it will undoubtedly have to be
subsidized for a long time to come by other dues-paying members in more
union-efficient sectors.
Furthermore, these small bank branches are part of an enormous, centrally administered bureaucratic structure. Although this kind of structure can
generate worker alienation, which, to some extent, counter-balances the antiunionization effects of smallness, it poses an additional problem. The potential
for the adoption of bank-wide personnel policies, which isolate unionized
branches and which make unionization appear unattractive to non-unionized
branches, is enormous. Likewise, the opportunities for unit manipulation and
promotion and transfer policies which appear punitive to employees and,
therefore, inhibit unionization are multiplied when such actions can be buried
in corporate paper and made to appear part of general business policies.
An additional feature of bank labour relations is the large percentage
of women employees. Historically women have been less permanently attached to the work force than men. It has yet to be demonstrated that this
makes them any less attracted to the principles of trade unionism than male
workers, but it does have two consequences. First of all, women had, and
still have, a much higher turnover rate than men. Particularly in small
units,2 4 the turnover problem necessitates constant attention to organizing
and keeping the troops together. This, of course, increases administrative
costs for unions. Second, male-dominated unions that share the prejudices of
society in general believe that women are less militant, less aggressive, less
likely to be aggrieved by arbitrary conduct than men and, therefore, less
22 2

See Bain, The Growth of White-Collar Unionism (Oxford, Clarendon Press,

1970) at 72 ff.
228 Id.
22
4 In larger units turnover due to inter-branch transfer would not be such a problem because transferees would probably stay within the same unit. Because of the turnover problem, units in Quebec have made the union shop a strike issue. Six units in the
Royal Bank in the Saguenay District struck over this issue in September, 1979, and at
the time of writing were still out.
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likely to be attracted to trade unionism. Bank clerical workers are not in
competition with male-dominated employment sectors, and therefore their
low wages are not seen as a threat to "union" working conditions. The concentration of women in banks has inhibited trade unionism because the trade
unions themselves have tended to turn their backs on "female job ghettos."
Historically, dissatisfied bank employees have escaped the system, as
evidenced by the high turnover rate, rather than fought. When they do organize in small units, they are isolated by the bank bureaucracy. The sheer
scale of the bank operation, as well as its centralized control, means that head
office, with a great deal at stake in keeping the unions out, can get its message
across to the employees much earlier, more often, and more effectively than
the unions can, either by improved terms and conditions of employment, by
verbal or written propaganda, or more subtle forms of economic terrorism.
None of this is intended to suggest that the banks are "rogue employers." They have fought the current organizing campaign with vigour but
they have probably done no more, and perhaps less, than any other wellorganized, well-advised, well-heeled cartel of businessmen would have done
in like circumstances and with as much at stake. They have not always stayed
inside the law and have certainly stretched the law to its utmost. The fundamental obstacle to bank organization is not that the banks are unregenerate
lawbreakers; it is that the structure and nature of the industry inhibits collective action and resists traditional organizing by established trade unions, as
well as providing great opportunities for the banks to discourage unionism
without breaking the law. These problems are only exacerbated by the unfair
labour practices and the opportunities presented by the bureaucracy to obscure matters for the labour board.
In order for unionization and collective bargaining to prosper within the
"state as neutral arbiter" or "adversary" system, there must, in general, be
three preconditions: (1) there must be few obstacles, either structural or
psychological, to collective action by employees, (2) the work situation must
be such as to attract trade unions or at least make them receptive to approaches from employees, and (3) employer interference of any kind must
be identifiable and controllable. Obviously, these conditions did not exist
historically in all industries that have been unionized, but the degree to which
they did subsist contributed directly to the speed and extent to which unionism spread in those industries. It is equally obvious that none of them subsists
in the banking industry. A system in which the state waits for the workers
to act is very poorly designed to promote the goal of unionization of banks.
Neither the Board nor Parliament has been blind to the special problems
posed for those unorganized sectors exemplified in this study by the banks.
The Board has attempted to tailor its responses in bank cases to the special
needs of the industry. Parliament amended the Code again in 1978 to
strengthen adversary mechanisms to deal with some of these special problems. To what extent have they been successful?
The most significant of the Board responses is, of course, the decision
that the individual branch is a unit appropriate for collective bargaining. The
branch unit is, as was recognized at the time and as subsequent history has
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demonstrated, less than ideal. The decision may have created as many problems on the bargaining level as it solved on the organizing level. As was
argued above, successful organizing is so intimately linked to successful bargaining in this sector that, at this stage, it would be misleading to suggest that
the unit decision solved the organizing problem for bank workers. Nevertheless, the earlier Kitimat decision, 22 rejecting branch unionism, had excluded
bank workers from access to collective bargaining almost as effectively as a
statutory exemption; the Victory Square decision220 "repealed" that exemption and opened the legal certification mechanism to bank workers if they
could overcome the other obstacles to its use.
One of these obstacles, it is suggested, is the fact that the structure of
banking provides opportunities for the employers to cover their tracks in the
commission of unfair labour practices more easily than traditional industrial
employers. Both Parliament and the Board have attempted to assist unions
with the problems of proof in unfair labour practice cases.
The most obvious of these attempts is the shifting of the burden of proof
to the employer in unfair labour practice cases dealing with anti-union discipline or discrimination. This provision was long overdue. It simply recognizes the fact that the employer is the party in possession of the facts that
would prove or disprove this kind of charge.
A "judicial" alteration in the unfair labour practice provisions that is
of great potential significance is the doctrine announced by the Board in the
Kamloops case:227 that anti-union animus is no longer an absolute requirement of an unfair labour practice.22 8 This should expand the range of employer conduct against which the union may effectively seek a remedy.
The other legislative amendment in the most recent package directed at
employer unfair labour practices is the CKOY amendment making the date
of application for certification the relevant date for determining whether or
not employees wish to be represented by a union.22 The concept behind
provisions like this is that it is impossible and counter-productive to administer a labour relations system by constantly policing the conduct of the
parties. The statutory goals can be better served by designing the system in
such a way that misconduct is futile. Thus, the CKOY amendment simply
eliminates the traditional union problem of proving employer misconduct
between the time of application and hearing, and proving that such misconduct affected the free expression of employee wishes, by providing that,
whatever effect the misconduct may have had on the employees, it can have
no effect on the fate of the certification application.
Although, the importance of this provision should not be minimized, it
goes a very short distance towards solving the problem of employer influence.
Many of the loopholes have already been identified. The employer can simply
225

Supra note 18.

=6 Supranote 37.
227

See text accompanying notes 161-68, supra.
151.
See text accompanying notes 97 ff., supra.

228 Supra note
229
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start his coercive tactics earlier; if he is successful no application will ever be
made. With unlimited access to employees, an extremely "well-oiled" interbranch communications network and a loyal management staff, he has ample
opportunity to do this. Furthermore, the CKOY amendment does not help
the union in the case of a vote.
Changes like these are all subject to the fundamental limitations of the
"state as neutral arbiter" or "adversary" model. Their effectiveness rests on
the assumption that problems will be brought before the Board by the parties,
that the parties are basically prepared to live within the system and need
only an occasional admonition to remind them of their obligations, and that
the remedies limited to the parties will effect the statutory goals. The lesson
of the unorganized sectors is that none of these assumptions is necessarily
valid. If collective bargaining is to thrive in these sectors, the state must take
a much more active promotional role. It must reach out and forestall the
development of labour relations problems, which by their very nature, would
never come under the scrutiny of the Board through the adversary system.
It must actively supervise employer conduct throughout the enterprise that
may affect the exercise of employees' organizational rights. It may even be
necessary for it to create organizational impetus where conditions are such
that it will not be generated in any other way. It must go beyond playing a
passive role within the adversary system.
A first step in this direction would be the recognition that employers
have no legitimate role to play in the certification process. This is not a
revolutionary leap for Canadian policy-makers. Already we have recognized
that the question of whether or not employees wish to unionize is a matter
to be determined by the exercise of their free choice. By certifying unions
on the basis of membership cards rather than representation votes, we deny
the employer the right to "campaign" for the30loyalty of his employees, a right
2
that is held so sacred in the United States.
We have, however, hesitated to extend this principle to its logical conclusion. We are still prepared to allow the employer a wide latitude of "free
speech." In the United States, of course, "free speech" has constitutional
Act has an explicit provision protecting
dimensions, and the Taft-Hartley
"employer free speech."1231 Whereas some Canadian provincial labour statutes
contain similar provisions,2 32 the Code does not. But the CLRB has chosen
230 See, e.g., Getman et al., Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality (New
York, Russell Gage Foundation, 1976) at 136: "The interest in encouraging peaceful
acceptance of employee choice is furthered if employers are given an opportunity to
campaign before employees make their final decision. The campaign may not affect
that decision, but the democratic principle of equality of opportunity to persuade supports the argument that it should take place."
231
§8(c), 61 Stat. 142 (1947).
232 See, e.g., The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 56: "nothing in
this section shall be deemed to deprive an employer of his freedom to express his
views so long as he does not use coercion, intimidation, threats, promises or undue
influence."
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to read a right to "free speech" into the Code.2 33 This latitude is not a
necessary implication of the statutory provisions of the Code. Boards have
recognized that, because of the employer's control over employees' economic
welfare, any involvement by him, positive or negative, in representational
issues tends to influence the employee's free choice. They have also recognized that the employer's unlimited access to employees during working
hours gives him an overwhelming advantage in getting his message, whatever
it may be, across to his employees. They have, therefore, been prepared to
subject employer conduct to strict scrutiny to see if it is coercive. Strict
scrutiny, however, may not be enough. Employer involvement of any kind,
whether it consists of the distribution of anti-union literature, the holding of
"informational" meetings, or even the dissemination of information about
existing, or new, employment conditions, serves no useful industrial relations
purpose. If it is felt that employees need a source of information to counterbalance the union, informational services could be administered by the Board.
Employer involvement is inherently coercive. What is needed is a rule prohibiting any stance by an employer other than absolute non-involvement in
any union's attempts to organize his employees.
Further, a rule may not be enough; its effective implementation would
require that the labour board take a much more active, visitorial role in
supervising employer conduct in the workplace. As has already been pointed
out, the most insidious and most successful cases of employer interference
are those which by their very nature are never brought before the labour
board. The Board should not wait for these problems to surface; it should
seek them out. This could be done through the more extensive use of labour
relations officers deployed by the Board, suo motu if necessary, to troubled
industries.
A useful conjunct to closer supervision of employer conduct would be
Board initiation of organization at the bargaining unit level. If the state views
collective bargaining as the best method of establishing terms and conditions
of employment, it should not be afraid to say so to individual employees, and
to lend its prestige to the trade union movement as a counter-balance to the
economic power of the employer. It is not suggested that the Board's employees should actually do the organizing; this would cast the Board in the
undesirable role of playing favourites among unions. Nonetheless, it should
certainly take on more extensive educational functions in advising employees
of their rights, of the advantages of collective bargaining, and of possible
avenues for securing union representation.
Closer supervision of employer conduct will help to identify problems,
but the question of remedies remains. A system that relied totally upon rooting out and solving labour relations problems individually would be administratively unworkable as well as prohibitively expensive. Rather, remedies that
deter improper conduct are a very important element in any workable system.
The Board's traditional remedies are tied very closely to the adversarial
233 Selkirk, supra note 124, at 698-99 (di), 551 (Can. L.R.B.R.). See also text
accompanying notes 124 if, supra.
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model. Back pay and reinstatement are based on traditional contract theory
and are designed to return individual employees to the position in which they
would have been had the violation not occurred. "Cease and desist" orders
follow the injunctive model and are designed to bring the parties' conduct
back into line with the law.
We have had, as yet, no real experience with the "rogue employer" in
Canada, but the J. P. Stevens cases in the United States demonstrate the
futility of such remedies where a largely unorganized employer is determined
to stay that way. The problem is that they have virtually no deterrent effect.
An employer who is forced to reinstate unlawfully discharged employees and
pay them back wages is very little worse off than if they had never fired them.
Discharged employees continue to serve the admonitory function of warning
other employees of the consequences of getting involved with unions even
if they are subsequently vindicated. Back wages are a small price for the
employer to pay.
"Cease and desist" orders likewise serve only to reinstitute a regime of
"law and order" as of the date on which the order was issued. The employer
is simply required to do what he should have been doing all along. This may
mean very little if his unlawful conduct has already had its effect. It almost
always pays, from the employer's point of view, to take a chance: even if his
conduct is subsequently
found unlawful, he will usually come out ahead on
23 4
the balance sheet
To date, the banks have largely escaped even these mild penalties for
their misconduct. There have been very few discharge cases, and in those
that the union won the employees had already secured alternative employment and did not wish reinstatement.2 3 5 Even the "cease and desist" order
has not been used extensively, since the Board has been unwilling to conclude
that a pattern of unfair labour practices exists so as to make such an order
appropriate. In its most recent "freeze" decision, the Board was forced to
recognize a corporate policy of anti-unionism, at least at the Commerce.236
In the face of such a policy, it will be searching for effective remedies. With
over 7,500 bank branches in the country, it will be impossible to deal with
employer misconduct on a branch-by-branch basis.
In order to counteract the employers' anti-union campaign in a way that
will make organizational rights real for bank workers, it may be necessary
to award remedies in those cases that do surface so as to effectively deter
misconduct throughout the system. Two remedies that could have that effect
are certification without a majority and organizational
damages, both of
237
which were sought in the 199 Yonge Street case.
Certification without a majority2 38 is merely an extension of the prin234 See Kovach, "J.P. Stevens and the Struggle for Union Organization" (1978),
29 Lab. L.J. 300 at 308.
:235 See 199 Yonge Street, supra note 147.
230 CIBC, supra note 152, at 19-20.
23
7 Supra note 146.
3
8 See text accompanying notes 106 if, supra.
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ciple embodied in the CKOY amendment, that the system should be designed,
insofar as is possible, to render unlawful or undesirable conduct futile. The
CKOY amendment makes misconduct futile after the application for certification has been made. Certification without a majority attempts to make it
futile at any time after an organizational campaign has begun. Obviously,
it is not a remedy to be used lightly because of its effect on the employees'
free choice. Nevertheless, there are situations in which the possible interference with employees' free choice may be less obnoxious than the possibility
that employer misconduct will successfully deprive employees of the right
to collective bargaining.
Certification without majority does not always lead to healthy bargaining relationships in those provinces where it has been adopted, but this
may not be sufficient reason to abandon it.239 Its primary function is as a
deterrent: if the employer knows that misconduct will not relieve him of the
obligation to bargain, he will be less likely to engage in it, and the union's
chances of securing majority support will be improved. It is a remedy that
Parliament should speedily incorporate into the Code.
Organizational damages are in the experimental stage in both the United
States and Canada, 240 and there is, as yet, no empirical evidence on their
deterrent effect. Common sense suggests, however, that an employer will
hesitate to engage in misconduct that puts him at risk of having to pay the
costs of the union's organizational campaign. They would constitute an additional entry on the debit side of the balance sheet, and along with more
traditional remedies they may swing the balance against unlawful conduct.
Furthermore, organizational damages would ensure that the union survives.
For a union like SORWUC, such damages could mean the difference between
victory and capitulation. For more established unions, such awards can increase the cost-efficiency of organizing sectors like banking to the point
where it becomes economically feasible.
Remedies like these ideally percolate down the system by convincing the
employer that it is useless and expensive to fight. They are still bound, however, by the adversary model in that their direct impact bears only on the
bargaining units that have come before the Board. In the banking world that
may not be sufficient. The Board may have to make the quantum leap of
awarding remedies that directly affect more than the bargaining unit before
it. The Board's statutory basis for making broad remedial orders is unquestionable. The only limitations on its power to make orders extending beyond
239 A survey of bargaining relationships conducted by the Research Branch of the
Ministry of Labour and covering the years 1970-79 discloses that in this time period
there were 21 certificates issued in cases where the union did not have majority support.
Of these, 14 led to first agreements and 7 did not. No data is available on whether
second and subsequent agreements have been reached.
240 Two Canadian labour boards have made awards of organizational damages. See
Kidd Bros. Produce Ltd., [1976] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 304 (B.C.); Academy of Medicine,
[1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 183 (Ont.); See also Radio Shack, [1979] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1220,
[1980] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 99, 80 C.L.L.C. 116,003 where the Ontario Labour Relations
Board awarded "bargaining" damages in a case of extreme bad faith bargaining.

1980]

Bank Workers' Unionization

the boundaries of particular bargaining units would be the natural justice
requirement that no order be made against a party who has not had notice
and a hearing. There is nothing to prevent it, in a certification hearing involving a specific branch of the Commerce, for example, from making an order
affecting all branches of that bank.
242
Such an order was sought in both 199 Yonge Street241 and Kamloops.
For reasons already discussed, the Board turned it down, but such requests
will arise again, and it is possible that such orders are not only appropriate
but necessary to deal with the bank situation.
The approach suggested here for the certification process would require
the state explicitly to "take sides" and make good on its commitment to the
promotion of the values of collective bargaining. It would completely abandon the model of the certification process as a battle between the union and
the employer for the hearts and minds of the employees in favour of a model
in which the employer is relegated to the sidelines and the state actively
assists the trade union movement in unionizing employees. This approach
would go a long way towards overcoming the obstacles to unionization in
the banks.
Two very important problems would, however, remain. One is that
increased state supervision of the certification process would finesse the
problem of union indifference to, or economic inability to cope with, the
unorganized sectors by usurping some of the historic functions of the trade
unions. If the unions can do the job, this should not be necessary, yet the
unions do not appear to be able to do the job. The CLC has been grandiloquent against the iniquities of the banks, but in the almost three years since
the Victory Square decision only twenty-nine units 243 have been organized
under its aegis. Its much-vaunted million-dollar organizing campaign appears
to be moribund and the BWOC and its satellite, the Union of Bank Employees, appear to be going the way of ACTE before them. Individual CLC
unions have done little better, and it is clear that they have neither the will
nor the resources to organize the entire system.
SORWUC, operating outside the mainstream of the Canadian trade
union movement, appears to be uniquely possessed of the drive and commitment necessary to organize and make the adversary system work for bank
workers. Paradoxically, however, SORWUC's ideological perspective, the
source of its uniqueness, has made it virtually incapable of operating within the
system. It was unable to make the compromises necessary to achieve a contract.
It could not work incrementally, preferring to throw away its small victory
and start over on a grander scale when it was unable to make revolutionary
gains in its first round of contract negotiations. SORWUC made extravagant
promises to its members-promises that it could not hope to fulfil within
241

Supra note 146.

242 Supra note

151.

See note 123. The Steelworkers units were organized under the umbrella of
the BWOC, as well as the UBE units.
243
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the system. 244 Whether in its province-wide assault SORWUC will set itself
more modest goals remains to be seen.
The second problem revolves around the fact that the organizational
process is only the first step in implementing the real policy goal: participation by workers in determining the conditions under which they will work.
The means to that end which our society has chosen is collective bargaining.
It is certainly possible to eliminate the adversary process at the certification
stage, when employees are choosing how they are going to deal with their
employer, but it is a contradiction in terms to eliminate the adversary process
in collective bargaining. This poses a real difficulty when the employer's
conduct at the bargaining table has at least as great an impact in retarding
the spread of collective bargaining in the industry as does his anti-union
propaganda and other attempts to influence employee free choice.
As was pointed out earlier, labour boards and legislatures are extremely
sensitive to the fact that state involvement in bargaining conduct interferes
with the free flow of economic forces which our society has determined to
be the best determinant of bargaining outcomes. As the sides have lined up
so far in the bank cases, the "free flow of economic forces" has resulted in
such an overwhelming concentration of power on the side of the employers
that unionized employees are scarcely better off than when they were bargaining individually. That balance may shift somewhat as unionization spreads
throughout the industry, and, if the suggestions outlined above for changes
in the certification process are adopted, the shift might come faster. Meanwhile, union weakness at the bargaining table is a deterrent to increased
unionization.
The Labour Board could be of much more assistance to bank unions
without abandoning the free collective bargaining system, simply by being
much more sensitive in unfair labour practice cases to the fact that its decisions affect the balance of bargaining power. Moreover, perhaps more radical
solutions to bargaining inequality may be desirable. An avenue worth exploring as a solution to bargaining weakness is first contract arbitration. This
remedy, which allows the Board to impose a first contract in certain situations, was added to the Code in 1978,245 and has yet to be tested in the bank
situation. First contract arbitration is a significant departure from the design
244 The bargaining demand to increase the base rate from $600 per month to $1,140
per month was just one example. The model contract between SORWUC and the
Electrical Trades Credit Union which the union used as an organizing tool contains a
union shop clause, a "personal rights" clause, a "hot cargo" clause, strong and novel
job security clauses, and provision for time off with pay for union meetings, among
other things. The fact that these clauses appear in a collective agreement is proof that
they are not unattainable, but it was unrealistic to suggest that there was a chance of
negotiating them in a first contract with "Big Five" banks.
245 Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 171.1 as am. by S.C. 1977-78, c. 27,
s. 62. The remedy is available only if the Minister in his discretion refers the matter to
the Board, and the Board in its discretion considers it advisable to award a contract.
In settling the contract the Board is, under s. 171.1(3) in its discretion, to take into
account:
(a) the extent to which the parties have, or have not, bargained in good faith
in an attempt to enter into the first collective agreement between them;
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of Canadian labour relations legislation. It is a legislative recognition of the
fact that the "freedom of contract" theory does not do universal justice in
labour relations. There are some situations in which the free flow of economic forces will result in no contract at all, or in a contract so unbalanced
as to bring the system of collective bargaining into disrepute. In such cases,
the state will intervene to impose a contract.
As currently interpreted by the Canada Labour Relations Board, 240
however, following the trail blazed by the British Columbia Labour Relations
Board,2 47 first contract arbitration will have little impact on the bargaining
problems in the banking industry. The CLRB has emphasized that first contract arbitration, as a departure from the entire scheme of the Code, is to be
employed only in the truly exceptional case.248 While the bargaining situation
in the banks is exceptional in the sense that it differs significantly from most
industrial situations with which labour boards have hitherto been faced, its
problems are not confined to isolated units; they are endemic to the industry
as a whole. The CLRB decision certainly does not indicate that it is prepared
to award first contract arbitration so widely.
Other elements in the CLRB interpretation of the first contract arbitration provisions of the Code also suggests its lack of utility for the banking
sector. First of all, the Board has made it clear that the remedy will not be
available where there is simply hard bargaining, or where the parties have
entrenched themselves in divergent positions and refuse to budge.249 These
situations must continue to be resolved by economic warfare. Second, the
Board has also made it clear that parties cannot look to first contract arbitration for breakthroughs in collective bargaining.250 Thus SORWUC, even if
it had met the threshold requirements, would251not have won the novel contract clauses in which it was most interested.
The SORWUC bargaining situation was never aired before the Board,
and it is perhaps barren to speculate on whether the facts would have attracted
Board intervention. It seems unlikely, particularly since the union had not
tried conventional economic weapons and, therefore, was not in a position
to demonstrate that the situation was so pathological that it could only be
cured by resorting to extraordinary measures. Furthermore, the banks were
clearly prepared to sign some sort of contract, albeit on terms very favourable
(b) the terms and conditions of employment, if any, negotiated through collective bargaining for employees performing the same or similar functions in the
same or similar circumstances as the employees in the bargaining unit; and
(c) such other matters as the Board considers will assist it in arriving at terms
and conditions that are fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
The Canadian Bankers' Association vigorously opposed first contract arbitration in a
presentation before the Standing Committee considering the amending legislation.
246 CJMS Radio Montreal Ltde (1979), 27 di 796, [1979] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 332.
247 London Drugs Ltd., [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 140.
248 CJMS Radio Montreal Ltde, supra note 246, at 843 (di), 372 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
249 Id. at 834-35 (di), 365-66 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
250
251

Id.
Id.
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to themselves if their subsequent accommodation with other unions is any
indication. In an application before the Board for first contract arbitration,
SORWUC might well have found itself cast as the villain.
First contract arbitration, at least as is currently administered, is not
the answer to inequalities of bargaining power embedded in the structure of
an entire economic sector. No labour board would award a contract spectacular enough to serve as a really effective organizing tool. Furthermore,
first contracts are not enough. With minimal organizing proceeding at a
snail's pace, units that signed first contracts are in no better position to make
significant gains in the second round than they were in the first. The problem
is a deep-seated and long-term one. It cannot be solved by a procedure
grounded on the assumption that the system is basically viable and calls for
state intervention only rarely in exceptional situations.
The problem posed by the banking industry goes right to the root of the
industrial relations system, in which the promotion of collective bargaining
is an important, perhaps transcendent value. There are other values worth
protecting, however, if collective bargaining is to fulfil its destined role as "an
instrument for the advancement of fundamental freedoms in our industrial
society.. ."52 These values include the right of employees freely to choose
whether, and how, they wish to act collectively, and the right of employees
to participate in a meaningful way in establishing their terms and conditions
of employment. The strict exclusion of the employer from any role in the
organizational process is a step towards protecting and nurturing the value
of employees' free choice, but there is a danger that excessively intimate
involvement of the state in that process may ultimately threaten the will to
collective action. There are those who would argue that the working class is
better off under a regime of voluntarism than one of statutory recognition,
because voluntarism makes unions more militant and more self-reliant.0 3
History does not bear out this claim, but there is a great deal more than a
grain of truth to the argument that the strongest, most effective unions are
those that were built through a sharp collective struggle. It may be that
unionism built through active state involvement will be merely another form
of company unionism-a weak, second-rate unionism that will fail to perform its destined function.
Furthermore, the involvement of a labour board in assessing and balancing bargaining positions and awarding remedies such as first contract arbitration is certainly a threat to free collective bargaining as a means of worker
participation in establishing the terms and conditions of employment. Such
involvement is often opposed strenuously by both trade unions and employers because of its potential to replace unilateral employer action with
unilateral state action to the exclusion of worker participation.
These risks may, however, be worth taking. It is clear that the present
system is not functioning either for bank workers or for workers in other
Woods Report, supra note 208, at 138.
See, e.g., Hart, "Union Recognition in America-The Legislative Snare" (1978),
7 Indus. L.J. 201.
252
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hard-core unorganized sectors. The lesson of this study is that, while some
helpful adjustments can be made on the periphery, the system is not likely
to work much better in the future without a whole new approach requiring
much more aggressive state involvement in the organizational process. A
policy choice has to be made: we must decide whether the possibility that a
new direction will undermine some of the values enshrined in the present
system is so frightening that we are prepared to abandon sectors like banking
to the not-so tender mercies of unilateral employer action in order to preserve the status quo. A nation that is committed to the principle that in this
last quarter of the twentieth century unilateral employer action is an unacceptable method of establishing terms and conditions of employment has a
clear choice.

